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Tug of War : = The Battle over American Policy toward China 1946-1949.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Tug of War :/
Reminder of title:	The Battle over American Policy toward China 1946-1949.
Author:	Baron, Michael Lewis.
Description:	1 online resource (327 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 41-07, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International41-07A.
Subject:	International law. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798204385245

Tug of War : = The Battle over American Policy toward China 1946-1949.
Baron, Michael Lewis.

Tug of War :The Battle over American Policy toward China 1946-1949. - 1 online resource (327 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 41-07, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Columbia University, 1980.

Includes bibliographical references

The process of policy making is reevaluated in this study is American policy toward China from 1946-1949. Documentary analysis indicates that accepted models do not adequately describe the formation of foreign policy. Instead of a "strain toward agreement" in which competing groups attempt to forge broad coalitions and reach consensus positions, examination of American and Chinese archives suggests that an apt characterization of the process is "victimization" or "forced compliance". Outcomes were not results of intersecting bureaucratic, organizational and personal interests, or products of compromises and trade-offs. Debate between the State Department and military establishment ended in stalemate broken only by the intervention of the President or the intrusion of extraneous events which transformed the decision making environment. Decisions examined include the imposition and lifting of an embargo on arms destined for Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces, creation of the China Aid Act, disposition of the Tsingtao naval base, cessation of aid and trade with areas occupied by the Chinese Communists, support of the Nationalist blockade of the mainland and preliminary planning concerning recognition of the new regime. Throughout the period, American officials considered China policy in the context of the global cold war against the Soviet Union. The American foreign policy elite shared the same goal: limitation, if not elimination of Soviet influence in China. However, the leaders did not share assumptions about the nature of the problem or preferred alternatives. Military figures equated Chinese Communism with Soviet domination which led them to recommend military and economic aid to the Nationalist side. Military analysis was predicated on a geopolitical notion - that Chinese Communist/Soviet control of China's industrial potential and manpower reserves sealed the fate of the Western world and Japan in the coming struggle for global hegemony. State Department China experts, supported by Secretaries of State Marshall and Acheson, rebutted military conceptions and proposed options. The State Department favored only limited ties to Chiang excluding military components to assure a flexible policy. State policy makers believed that a Communist ruled China posed no threat to the United States and that nationalistic leaders would eventually divorce themselves from Moscow. New light is cast on the role of President Truman. Contrary to expectations, Truman was an activist in foreign policy basing decisions primarily on personal proclivities, not political imperatives. The President repeatedly rejected advice on China given by Marshall who had first hand experience in China, was widely respected, and who Truman considered to be the "greatest man of the century". The study also explores the implications of American policy for the Chinese Nationalists and Communists. Their respective attitudes and perceptions are highlighted through analysis of Chinese language sources. The profound consequences of decisions made during the final stages of the Chinese civil war on the course of subsequent Sino-American relations are underlined. The findings suggest that additional research is needed on a class of long neglected foreign policy decisions. Important policy arenas involving Cabinet officials and the President where there is time to disagree should be studied to supplement abundant monographs on crises and on routines. The prevailing belief that the cold war in Asia can be separated from the cold war in Europe must be subject to further inquiry, as must the motivations behind President Truman's actions.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798204385245Subjects--Topical Terms:

557047
International law.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Tug of War : = The Battle over American Policy toward China 1946-1949.
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520 $a The process of policy making is reevaluated in this study is American policy toward China from 1946-1949. Documentary analysis indicates that accepted models do not adequately describe the formation of foreign policy. Instead of a "strain toward agreement" in which competing groups attempt to forge broad coalitions and reach consensus positions, examination of American and Chinese archives suggests that an apt characterization of the process is "victimization" or "forced compliance". Outcomes were not results of intersecting bureaucratic, organizational and personal interests, or products of compromises and trade-offs. Debate between the State Department and military establishment ended in stalemate broken only by the intervention of the President or the intrusion of extraneous events which transformed the decision making environment. Decisions examined include the imposition and lifting of an embargo on arms destined for Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces, creation of the China Aid Act, disposition of the Tsingtao naval base, cessation of aid and trade with areas occupied by the Chinese Communists, support of the Nationalist blockade of the mainland and preliminary planning concerning recognition of the new regime. Throughout the period, American officials considered China policy in the context of the global cold war against the Soviet Union. The American foreign policy elite shared the same goal: limitation, if not elimination of Soviet influence in China. However, the leaders did not share assumptions about the nature of the problem or preferred alternatives. Military figures equated Chinese Communism with Soviet domination which led them to recommend military and economic aid to the Nationalist side. Military analysis was predicated on a geopolitical notion - that Chinese Communist/Soviet control of China's industrial potential and manpower reserves sealed the fate of the Western world and Japan in the coming struggle for global hegemony. State Department China experts, supported by Secretaries of State Marshall and Acheson, rebutted military conceptions and proposed options. The State Department favored only limited ties to Chiang excluding military components to assure a flexible policy. State policy makers believed that a Communist ruled China posed no threat to the United States and that nationalistic leaders would eventually divorce themselves from Moscow. New light is cast on the role of President Truman. Contrary to expectations, Truman was an activist in foreign policy basing decisions primarily on personal proclivities, not political imperatives. The President repeatedly rejected advice on China given by Marshall who had first hand experience in China, was widely respected, and who Truman considered to be the "greatest man of the century". The study also explores the implications of American policy for the Chinese Nationalists and Communists. Their respective attitudes and perceptions are highlighted through analysis of Chinese language sources. The profound consequences of decisions made during the final stages of the Chinese civil war on the course of subsequent Sino-American relations are underlined. The findings suggest that additional research is needed on a class of long neglected foreign policy decisions. Important policy arenas involving Cabinet officials and the President where there is time to disagree should be studied to supplement abundant monographs on crises and on routines. The prevailing belief that the cold war in Asia can be separated from the cold war in Europe must be subject to further inquiry, as must the motivations behind President Truman's actions.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2024
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