國立虎尾科技大學 |

The economic behavior of village leaders in China's reform economy.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The economic behavior of village leaders in China's reform economy./
作者:	Rozelle, Scott Douglas.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (180 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 52-09, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International52-09A.
標題:	Political science. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798207425849

The economic behavior of village leaders in China's reform economy.
Rozelle, Scott Douglas.

The economic behavior of village leaders in China's reform economy. - 1 online resource (180 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 52-09, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Cornell University, 1991.

Includes bibliographical references

Reform in China has radically altered the rural economy in the past ten years through a series of decollectivization and decentralization policies. While these measures have led to increased productivity and growth in the sector, policy makers are becoming less effective in carrying out development programs. Structural rigidities in China's reform economy have created an environment where policies trigger unexpected responses from local agents--both government officials and farm households. These responses distort policies and can lead to unanticipated consequences. This thesis explores the structure of the Chinese local economy, focusing on the role of the village leader. The ultimate objective is to predict how changes in key agricultural policies affect the performance of the rural economy. To understand this dynamic system, the relationships among key government officials, village leaders and farm households are examined within a framework of principal-agent theory. A dynamic control model of the village leader is specified, assuming that village leaders are maximizing a multiple-attribute utility function. Using time-series, cross-section village data, structural and control equations for industrial output, grain yields, capital, non-farm employment and hybrid rice are estimated. These estimated structural and control parameters are used to estimate the weights on the variables in the village leader's utility function. Results confirm that village leaders are preoccupied with rural industrialization but are also concerned about maintaining agricultural productivity. The model is used to simulate the effects of changes in agricultural price, grain procurement and industrial loan policies on performance of the village economy. Within the constrained village economy, grain yields decline when either agricultural prices (represented by a price index which includes both cash crops and grain prices) or procurement quotas are increased. Industrial profits and capital assets decline in response to loan cutbacks. To offset losses in utility due to falling profits that occur when relative industrial prices decline (in response to increasing agricultural prices), capital assets of village industries increase. These seemingly counter-intuitive results are explained by looking at how the policy variables affect the village leader's choice of control variables.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798207425849Subjects--Topical Terms:

558774
Political science.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

The economic behavior of village leaders in China's reform economy.
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520 $a Reform in China has radically altered the rural economy in the past ten years through a series of decollectivization and decentralization policies. While these measures have led to increased productivity and growth in the sector, policy makers are becoming less effective in carrying out development programs. Structural rigidities in China's reform economy have created an environment where policies trigger unexpected responses from local agents--both government officials and farm households. These responses distort policies and can lead to unanticipated consequences. This thesis explores the structure of the Chinese local economy, focusing on the role of the village leader. The ultimate objective is to predict how changes in key agricultural policies affect the performance of the rural economy. To understand this dynamic system, the relationships among key government officials, village leaders and farm households are examined within a framework of principal-agent theory. A dynamic control model of the village leader is specified, assuming that village leaders are maximizing a multiple-attribute utility function. Using time-series, cross-section village data, structural and control equations for industrial output, grain yields, capital, non-farm employment and hybrid rice are estimated. These estimated structural and control parameters are used to estimate the weights on the variables in the village leader's utility function. Results confirm that village leaders are preoccupied with rural industrialization but are also concerned about maintaining agricultural productivity. The model is used to simulate the effects of changes in agricultural price, grain procurement and industrial loan policies on performance of the village economy. Within the constrained village economy, grain yields decline when either agricultural prices (represented by a price index which includes both cash crops and grain prices) or procurement quotas are increased. Industrial profits and capital assets decline in response to loan cutbacks. To offset losses in utility due to falling profits that occur when relative industrial prices decline (in response to increasing agricultural prices), capital assets of village industries increase. These seemingly counter-intuitive results are explained by looking at how the policy variables affect the village leader's choice of control variables.
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