國立虎尾科技大學 |

The Creation of the Maritime Strategy : = The US Navy, National Strategy, and the End of the Cold War.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The Creation of the Maritime Strategy :/
其他題名:	The US Navy, National Strategy, and the End of the Cold War.
作者:	DiEugenio, John Kiprian.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (449 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-07, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-07A.
標題:	Military history. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798381385137

The Creation of the Maritime Strategy : = The US Navy, National Strategy, and the End of the Cold War.
DiEugenio, John Kiprian.

The Creation of the Maritime Strategy :The US Navy, National Strategy, and the End of the Cold War. - 1 online resource (449 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-07, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2023.

Includes bibliographical references

In 1968, the onset of US-Soviet nuclear parity and the decline in American maritime superiority compelled national and naval leaders to redesign strategy. As the Nixon administration advanced detente, or reduced tensions with the Soviet Union, two competing ideas about maritime power emerged within the Navy. This dissertation explores the limits of translating ideas into policy through the relationship between maritime and national strategy.In 1970, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt advocated for a maritime strategy of Sea Control. Zumwalt's strategy was a reaction to the Soviet fleet's expansion and shrinking US budgets that eroded the service's post-1945 posture of global maritime supremacy. The limited objective of Sea Control required the Navy to transform its force structure. Rather than a fleet of expensive, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, Zumwalt advocated for more numerous, small, conventionally-powered carriers to defend sea lanes, especially those in the Atlantic. Ironically, although Sea Control fit within the Nixon-Kissinger strategy, Zumwalt's poor relationship with the White House doomed the concept. Moreover, naval leaders viewed Sea Control as an anathema to US strategy and culture. Between 1975 and 1987, Admirals James Holloway, Thomas Hayward, and Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman Jr. argued that the Navy should instead project power aggressively near Soviet home waters and onto the Soviet flanks. The three leaders shepherded ideas derived from early 20th-century strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan back into the modern sea service. The best way to defend the sea lanes, they reasoned, was through forward, offensive operations with large, nuclear-powered carriers. This neo-Mahanian vision required a change in national strategy as much as maritime strategy. Fortunately for them, President Ronald Reagan agreed. Events, such as the 1979 shattering of detente and the Falklands War, legislation, such as the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, presidential elections, and personalities transformed US strategy. In the 1980s, defense leaders reached a consensus that the neo-Mahanian way of war was integral to Cold War strategy. An energized Congress funded the Navy to regain maritime superiority. While the neo-Mahanian vision did not transmit to the post-Cold War Navy, its advocates built the foundation of maritime power for the next forty years.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798381385137Subjects--Topical Terms:

810444
Military history.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Cold WarIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

The Creation of the Maritime Strategy : = The US Navy, National Strategy, and the End of the Cold War.
LDR:03770ntm a22003857 4500 001 1143214
005 20240513060824.5
006 m o d
007 cr mn ---uuuuu
008 250605s2023 xx obm 000 0 eng d
020 $a 9798381385137
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI30812206
035 $a AAI30812206
040 $a MiAaPQ $b eng $c MiAaPQ $d NTU
100 1 $a DiEugenio, John Kiprian. $3 1467839
245 1 4 $a The Creation of the Maritime Strategy : $b The US Navy, National Strategy, and the End of the Cold War.
264 0 $c 2023
300 $a 1 online resource (449 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-07, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Lee, Wayne E.;Glatthaar, Joseph T.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2023.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a In 1968, the onset of US-Soviet nuclear parity and the decline in American maritime superiority compelled national and naval leaders to redesign strategy. As the Nixon administration advanced detente, or reduced tensions with the Soviet Union, two competing ideas about maritime power emerged within the Navy. This dissertation explores the limits of translating ideas into policy through the relationship between maritime and national strategy.In 1970, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt advocated for a maritime strategy of Sea Control. Zumwalt's strategy was a reaction to the Soviet fleet's expansion and shrinking US budgets that eroded the service's post-1945 posture of global maritime supremacy. The limited objective of Sea Control required the Navy to transform its force structure. Rather than a fleet of expensive, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, Zumwalt advocated for more numerous, small, conventionally-powered carriers to defend sea lanes, especially those in the Atlantic. Ironically, although Sea Control fit within the Nixon-Kissinger strategy, Zumwalt's poor relationship with the White House doomed the concept. Moreover, naval leaders viewed Sea Control as an anathema to US strategy and culture. Between 1975 and 1987, Admirals James Holloway, Thomas Hayward, and Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman Jr. argued that the Navy should instead project power aggressively near Soviet home waters and onto the Soviet flanks. The three leaders shepherded ideas derived from early 20th-century strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan back into the modern sea service. The best way to defend the sea lanes, they reasoned, was through forward, offensive operations with large, nuclear-powered carriers. This neo-Mahanian vision required a change in national strategy as much as maritime strategy. Fortunately for them, President Ronald Reagan agreed. Events, such as the 1979 shattering of detente and the Falklands War, legislation, such as the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, presidential elections, and personalities transformed US strategy. In the 1980s, defense leaders reached a consensus that the neo-Mahanian way of war was integral to Cold War strategy. An energized Congress funded the Navy to regain maritime superiority. While the neo-Mahanian vision did not transmit to the post-Cold War Navy, its advocates built the foundation of maritime power for the next forty years.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2024
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Military history. $3 810444
650 4 $a Law. $3 671705
650 4 $a Military studies. $3 1148605
653 $a Cold War
653 $a Detente
653 $a Maritime strategy
653 $a National strategy
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0722
690 $a 0750
690 $a 0398
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. $b History. $3 1184314
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 85-07A.
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=30812206 $z click for full text (PQDT)