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Great Power Cyberpolitics : = Re-Interpreting Offensive Realism and Power Transition Theory for Cyber Deterrence.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Great Power Cyberpolitics :/
其他題名:	Re-Interpreting Offensive Realism and Power Transition Theory for Cyber Deterrence.
作者:	Akdag, Yavuz.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (314 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-06, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-06B.
標題:	Information technology. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798381102161

Great Power Cyberpolitics : = Re-Interpreting Offensive Realism and Power Transition Theory for Cyber Deterrence.
Akdag, Yavuz.

Great Power Cyberpolitics :Re-Interpreting Offensive Realism and Power Transition Theory for Cyber Deterrence. - 1 online resource (314 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-06, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of South Florida, 2023.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation assesses the empirical relevancy of realist International Relations (IR) theory in cyberspace and shows how a richer IR-based theory of cyber conflict can enhance the understanding of interstate cyber deterrence, especially in the context of US-Sino hegemonic cyber conflict or cyberwar. As states increasingly engage in cyber conflict by exploiting security vulnerabilities due to global interconnectivity (i.e., the Internet), cyber threat has become relevant for national security. Scholars constructed cyber deterrence to counter the threat using the fundamentals of the Cold War nuclear deterrence. Yet this approach is highly contested; cyberspace defies traditional deterrence concepts. Further theoretical analysis is necessary to meet the challenges of cyber conflict and deterrence.However, IR scholars have not yet adequately studied the evolution of cyber conflict as a part of the development of realist theory or great power dynamics. Theory-testing studies remain marginal due mainly to epistemological problems (e.g., secrecy of cyber operations), and theory-application mostly lacks systematicity, rigor, and empirical robustness. Recently, the cyber deterrence literature dropped in volume, risking theoretical stagnation due to diminished conceptual fertility and weak explanatory schema. Consequently, cyberspace persistently presents both a theoretical and practical challenge. I confront this challenge in two ways. First, I intend to revitalize the scholarship on cyber deterrence in the IR literature. Second, I aim to bridge theory-testing and -application gaps using Offensive Realism (OR) and Power Transition Theory (PTT).First, I qualitatively evaluate how well OR`s prediction holds in cyberspace that regional hegemons would seek global expansion of power and influence if natural barriers (oceans) were removed. My case study is the U.S. given its relation to the theory, the availability of literature on Stuxnet and Snowden revelations, and the publicity of cyber policy documents. Despite the exigency of modifying OR`s key concepts of anarchy and hegemony, I argue that the theory has a meaningful predictive power in cyberspace. Analysis affirms OR`s prediction; the U.S. appears to pursue global cyber hegemony using offensive cyber strategies for deterrence.Second, I apply OR`s systemic and structural variables of polarity, counter-hegemonic balancing, and geography and PTT`s variables of power dis/parity, dis/satisfaction, relative speed of growth differentials to the Sino-US case to inform the efficacy of cyber deterrence. I argue that there is analytical congruence between cyber application of OR and PTT in terms of how and when cyber deterrence is likely to fail. The examination suggests that cyber deterrence illuminated by the Cold War nuclear deterrence based on balance of power logic is ill-suited to prevent China-US cyber conflict or cyberwar. Interstate cyber deterrence interactions favor cyber power maximization -not parity-, which has significant implications for policy and theory. Theoretical/Conceptual implications relate to OR`s concept of hegemony, traditional anarchy-hierarchy dichotomy, and strategies great powers employ to achieve security and power. I propose an alternative conceptual framework regarding hegemony and an integrated framework of "hierarchy in anarchy" and introduce new security strategies available to states to advance their interests in cyberspace. This study contributes to intellectual efforts to ensure national and global security and the process of building cyber version of OR and PTT.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798381102161Subjects--Topical Terms:

559429
Information technology.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Cyber powerIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Great Power Cyberpolitics : = Re-Interpreting Offensive Realism and Power Transition Theory for Cyber Deterrence.
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