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Essays on the Political Economy of Development.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on the Political Economy of Development./
Author:	Ascencio Pastora, Salvador.
Description:	1 online resource (204 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-12B.
Subject:	Political science. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798382777979

Essays on the Political Economy of Development.
Ascencio Pastora, Salvador.

Essays on the Political Economy of Development. - 1 online resource (204 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2024.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation presents an empirical investigation on how strategic choices from partisan competition affect the effectiveness of government and the consolidation of the party system in a developing democracy.The first chapter explores how partisan incentives affect the fiscal performance of local governments while trying to disentangle voluntary actions from capacity constraints. Using a panel of Mexican municipalities, proposing a measure of the deviation from maximum tax collection, and relying on a regression discontinuity design, I provide evidence that municipalities with vertical partisan alignment with state governments deviate to a larger extent from the maximum tax revenue collectible than municipalities without such partisan alignment. These politically aligned municipalities more than compensate these foregone resources with transfers from their copartisans in higher orders of government and thus are able to increase total expenditures. The observed effect is not driven by systematic differences in the underlying determinants of tax collection like the tax base or the collection infrastructure.The second paper studies the rationale and electoral returns of implementing nominally programmatic social policy programs through a structure of partisan brokers. This is an example of how incumbents, constrained by institutions that limit the menu of available vote-buying strategies, manage to maximize their electoral returns. I develop a theory that endogenizes the decision-making process behind the adoption of this strategy, and provide evidence of their effectiveness by analyzing the case of the Servants of the Nation in Mexico.To generate causally identified evidence of the electoral impact of a large-scale deployment operation of these brokers, I employ a regression discontinuity research design that leverages an arbitrary discontinuity in the assignment of municipalities to different canvassing strategies based on the number of families enrolled in social programs in the previous administration. Municipalities where the Servants of the Nation were intensively deployed to a door-to-door canvassing strategy had an increase in vote share for the incumbent party at the national level equivalent to 31% of the average change in support across elections.The third chapter, which is a coauthored project with Martin Gou, investigates how ideologically heterogeneous coalitions (strategically undertaken to maximize electoral returns at the potential cost of partisan brand dilution) affect the stability of party systems through citizen's attachment to political parties and their perceptions of the effectiveness of democracy. We conducted a face-to-face survey experiment in Mexico to test whether salient information on differences across parties within the same pre-electoral coalitions affects voters' identification with political parties. Our findings indicate that, while the perception of differences across heterogeneous parties within coalitions increases, voters do not translate this into lower partisan identification or to lower feelings of being represented by the party.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798382777979Subjects--Topical Terms:

558774
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

GovernmentsIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Essays on the Political Economy of Development.
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500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: B.
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520 $a This dissertation presents an empirical investigation on how strategic choices from partisan competition affect the effectiveness of government and the consolidation of the party system in a developing democracy.The first chapter explores how partisan incentives affect the fiscal performance of local governments while trying to disentangle voluntary actions from capacity constraints. Using a panel of Mexican municipalities, proposing a measure of the deviation from maximum tax collection, and relying on a regression discontinuity design, I provide evidence that municipalities with vertical partisan alignment with state governments deviate to a larger extent from the maximum tax revenue collectible than municipalities without such partisan alignment. These politically aligned municipalities more than compensate these foregone resources with transfers from their copartisans in higher orders of government and thus are able to increase total expenditures. The observed effect is not driven by systematic differences in the underlying determinants of tax collection like the tax base or the collection infrastructure.The second paper studies the rationale and electoral returns of implementing nominally programmatic social policy programs through a structure of partisan brokers. This is an example of how incumbents, constrained by institutions that limit the menu of available vote-buying strategies, manage to maximize their electoral returns. I develop a theory that endogenizes the decision-making process behind the adoption of this strategy, and provide evidence of their effectiveness by analyzing the case of the Servants of the Nation in Mexico.To generate causally identified evidence of the electoral impact of a large-scale deployment operation of these brokers, I employ a regression discontinuity research design that leverages an arbitrary discontinuity in the assignment of municipalities to different canvassing strategies based on the number of families enrolled in social programs in the previous administration. Municipalities where the Servants of the Nation were intensively deployed to a door-to-door canvassing strategy had an increase in vote share for the incumbent party at the national level equivalent to 31% of the average change in support across elections.The third chapter, which is a coauthored project with Martin Gou, investigates how ideologically heterogeneous coalitions (strategically undertaken to maximize electoral returns at the potential cost of partisan brand dilution) affect the stability of party systems through citizen's attachment to political parties and their perceptions of the effectiveness of democracy. We conducted a face-to-face survey experiment in Mexico to test whether salient information on differences across parties within the same pre-electoral coalitions affects voters' identification with political parties. Our findings indicate that, while the perception of differences across heterogeneous parties within coalitions increases, voters do not translate this into lower partisan identification or to lower feelings of being represented by the party.
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650 4 $a Public administration. $3 562473
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653 $a Governments
653 $a Party system
653 $a Democracy
653 $a Fiscal performance
653 $a Partisan competition
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