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Nietzsche on Strength.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Nietzsche on Strength./
作者:	Lambert, Thomas Carroll.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (106 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-10, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-10A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798379407810

Nietzsche on Strength.
Lambert, Thomas Carroll.

Nietzsche on Strength. - 1 online resource (106 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-10, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2023.

Includes bibliographical references

In this dissertation, I offer an extended interpretation of nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche's ethical ideal of strength [Starke]. As I argue in these chapters, Nietzschean strength is strength of will. Furthermore, I argue, Nietzsche advances a distinctive and philosophically rich theory of what it is to have a strong or weak will.In Chapter 1, I confront the notorious passages in which Nietzsche appears to be engaged in little more than the crude worship of physical dominance and martial prowess. I argue that such a flat-footed interpretation would be mistaken, and I demonstrate that Nietzsche's praise of strength and criticism of weakness is best understood as referring to strength and weakness of will. This raises the question guiding the subsequent two chapters, namely, how Nietzsche conceives of these notions.In Chapter 2, I turn to the question of how Nietzsche accounts for the phenomenon historically identified with weakness of will in the Western philosophical tradition, akrasia. Akratic action is typically defined as action contrary to an agent's better judgment, but Nietzsche's view appears to be that both action and better judgment have their source in the strength of the drives. Thus, it is unclear how they could ever diverge. I demonstrate, however, that Nietzsche can ultimately account for akrasia.As I show in Chapter 3, however, Nietzsche does not identify weakness of will with akrasia. Instead, Nietzschean weakness of will is a condition of character, resulting from the ordering of one's drives, that disposes agents not only to act akratically, but also to exhibit another sort of agential failure: irresoluteness, the failure to persist in their intentions. Strong agents, in turn, are insulated from experiencing either phenomenon. Hence, Nietzsche's theory of strength and weakness of will is a unifying theory.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798379407810Subjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

ActionIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Nietzsche on Strength.
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