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Perceiving the Essence : = A Husserlian Explication of Aristotle's Defense of Non-Contradiction.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Perceiving the Essence :/
Reminder of title:	A Husserlian Explication of Aristotle's Defense of Non-Contradiction.
Author:	Clemons, Matthew.
Description:	1 online resource (235 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-12B.
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798379736156

Perceiving the Essence : = A Husserlian Explication of Aristotle's Defense of Non-Contradiction.
Clemons, Matthew.

Perceiving the Essence :A Husserlian Explication of Aristotle's Defense of Non-Contradiction. - 1 online resource (235 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Stony Brook, 2023.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation takes up a philosophical problem-or better yet a direction-found in Aristotle's Metaphysics book IV (Γ) and explicates, clarifies, and enriches it in and through Husserl's work. Book IV is in large part a defense of the legitimacy of the principle of noncontradiction (PNC). In defense of the principle, Aristotle encounters skeptical objections of two kinds. The first is of Heracleitean origin. Since, according to the Heracleitean, all things are constantly changing, the requisite determinacy required for the principle of noncontradiction to hold is missing. Against the Heracleitean, Aristotle points to the metaphysical doctrine of essence as entelechy, that which remains the same in and through change, as the ground of the principle of non-contradiction. The second kind of skeptical objection that Aristotle encounters issues from the Protagorean camp, is epistemologically motivated, and targets the contention that it is impossible to believe a contradiction. Because the principle of non-contradiction cannot be demonstrated without already assuming the principle, Aristotle resorts to a "demonstration by refutation," the rules of which the Protagorean constantly disregards. Aristotle is not, however, without a response even for the most obstinate of interlocutors. He first attempts a transcendental argument of sorts, emphasizing that essences are the condition for the possibility of perception and action, which the Protagorean cannot do without. This argument ultimately fails in that it remains vulnerable to the critique that there is a distinction between what appears to us and what is. I argue that Aristotle hints at a rebuttal, arguing that essences are, in fact, given in perception, although he does not fill his account out. For that, I turn to Husserl, first indicating how his understanding of motivated possibility and his eidetic method point beyond the being/appearance distinction that transcendental arguments suffer from. I then use Husserl's own account of perception to clarify Aristotle's seemingly contradictory contention that perception is at once a kind of flux and gives the essence indirectly. Finally, I follow Husserl in his eidetic-genetic investigations, showing how the essence is, in fact, given.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798379736156Subjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Metaphysics book IVIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Perceiving the Essence : = A Husserlian Explication of Aristotle's Defense of Non-Contradiction.
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