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Essays in the Economics of Health Insurance.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays in the Economics of Health Insurance./
Author:	Serna Borrero, Natalia.
Description:	1 online resource (212 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-12B.
Subject:	Health care management. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798379692858

Essays in the Economics of Health Insurance.
Serna Borrero, Natalia.

Essays in the Economics of Health Insurance. - 1 online resource (212 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2023.

Includes bibliographical references

Rising health care costs motivate the use of demand- and supply-side mechanisms to control the consumption of health services, and generate incentives for insurers to engage in risk selection strategies. Using data from the Colombian health care system, I first measure how demand for different health services responds to cost-sharing using a regression discontinuity design. I then study how cost-sharing impacts negotiated service prices between insurers and hospitals using a model of Nash-in-Nash bargaining. Finally, I quantify the impact of risk selection incentives on hospital network breadth using a model of insurer competition in networks. I find that cost-sharing is effective at reducing health care costs, but that consumption reductions happen across necessary and unnecessary services. Counterfactual simulations show that negotiated hospital prices are U-shaped with respect to the coinsurance rate, and minimized at a coinsurance rate of 30 percent. Findings of the model of insurer competition in networks show that insurers engage in risk selection by providing narrow networks. Improving the risk adjustment formula reduces selection incentives and motivates insurers to expand their networks in every health service. Allowing insurers to compete on premiums and networks, shows that price and non-price characteristics of insurance contracts are substitute mechanisms for risk selection.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798379692858Subjects--Topical Terms:

1148454
Health care management.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Cost sharingIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Essays in the Economics of Health Insurance.
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500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: B.
500 $a Advisor: Sorensen, Alan T.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2023.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Rising health care costs motivate the use of demand- and supply-side mechanisms to control the consumption of health services, and generate incentives for insurers to engage in risk selection strategies. Using data from the Colombian health care system, I first measure how demand for different health services responds to cost-sharing using a regression discontinuity design. I then study how cost-sharing impacts negotiated service prices between insurers and hospitals using a model of Nash-in-Nash bargaining. Finally, I quantify the impact of risk selection incentives on hospital network breadth using a model of insurer competition in networks. I find that cost-sharing is effective at reducing health care costs, but that consumption reductions happen across necessary and unnecessary services. Counterfactual simulations show that negotiated hospital prices are U-shaped with respect to the coinsurance rate, and minimized at a coinsurance rate of 30 percent. Findings of the model of insurer competition in networks show that insurers engage in risk selection by providing narrow networks. Improving the risk adjustment formula reduces selection incentives and motivates insurers to expand their networks in every health service. Allowing insurers to compete on premiums and networks, shows that price and non-price characteristics of insurance contracts are substitute mechanisms for risk selection.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2024
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Health care management. $3 1148454
650 4 $a Health sciences. $3 1179212
653 $a Cost sharing
653 $a Health insurance
653 $a Hospital networks
653 $a Risk adjustment
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710 2 $a The University of Wisconsin - Madison. $b Economics. $3 1184399
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 84-12B.
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