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Essays in Economic Theory and the Economics of Information.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays in Economic Theory and the Economics of Information./
Author:	Kyriazis, Panagiotis.
Description:	1 online resource (180 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-11A.
Subject:	Information science. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798382757759

Essays in Economic Theory and the Economics of Information.
Kyriazis, Panagiotis.

Essays in Economic Theory and the Economics of Information. - 1 online resource (180 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2024.

Includes bibliographical references

In the rapidly growing literature of information economics, this dissertation comprises three distinct essays on economic theory. It explores the multifaceted influence of information asymmetries and information dissemination across different economic contexts. The three chapters investigate the (in)effectiveness of information manipulation as a means for a regime to survive an attack, the pivotal role of leadership in coordination problems under information asymmetries, and the interplay between information intermediaries, market mechanisms, and consumer welfare in the modern economy.The first chapter, co-authored with Edmund Lou, revisits the effectiveness of information manipulation by regimes within the framework of a regime-change global game. Contrary to previous findings, our analysis suggests that costly information manipulation may not necessarily enhance the regime's survival prospects when faced with uprisings. This finding parallels the findings of the signal-jamming literature in economics, where costly actions do not alter equilibrium outcomes but are undertaken nonetheless due to strategic considerations. Our study highlights a novel aspect of the possibility of engaging in information manipulation, for instance, via propaganda, where the regime, despite being informed about its strength, falls into a trap of its own making.The second chapter, co-authored with Edmund Lou, shifts focus to coordination, scrutinizing the conditions under which a leader can successfully orchestrate collective action among followers with dispersed information. Our findings underscore a paradox wherein precise information held by followers can actually undermine efficient leadership, leading to potential miscoordination and inefficient outcomes. Through a global games model that features a leader and a team of followers, we demonstrate that both the signaling effect of the leader's actions and the followers' strategic uncertainty play critical roles in determining the success of coordination efforts. This analysis not only contributes to our understanding of leadership but also offers insights into the broader implications of information precision in strategic decision-making contexts.The third chapter, co-authored with Edmund Lou, explores the implications of information intermediation on consumer decision-making and market outcomes in the modern economy. By examining the strategic interaction between sellers, consumers, and information intermediaries in a screening model, we investigate how information disclosure choices by intermediaries can significantly influence product variety, consumer welfare, and market efficiency. Our results illustrate that as intermediaries place greater emphasis on consumer surplus over product quality, sellers are prompted to strategically expand their product range. Intriguingly, this augmented product variety decreases economic efficiency compared to scenarios where direct seller-to-consumer information provision is the norm. The role of information intermediaries proves pivotal in shaping consumer welfare, market profitability, and economic efficiency. Thus, our insights underscore the complexities introduced by these intermediaries that policymakers and market designers must consider when designing policies centered on consumer learning and information transparency.Collectively, this thesis offers a comprehensive analysis of information economics' applications across different domains. By integrating theoretical models with practical applications, it contributes to a deeper understanding of how information asymmetries and strategic information dissemination influence economic outcomes.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798382757759Subjects--Topical Terms:

561178
Information science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Modern economyIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Essays in Economic Theory and the Economics of Information.
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504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a In the rapidly growing literature of information economics, this dissertation comprises three distinct essays on economic theory. It explores the multifaceted influence of information asymmetries and information dissemination across different economic contexts. The three chapters investigate the (in)effectiveness of information manipulation as a means for a regime to survive an attack, the pivotal role of leadership in coordination problems under information asymmetries, and the interplay between information intermediaries, market mechanisms, and consumer welfare in the modern economy.The first chapter, co-authored with Edmund Lou, revisits the effectiveness of information manipulation by regimes within the framework of a regime-change global game. Contrary to previous findings, our analysis suggests that costly information manipulation may not necessarily enhance the regime's survival prospects when faced with uprisings. This finding parallels the findings of the signal-jamming literature in economics, where costly actions do not alter equilibrium outcomes but are undertaken nonetheless due to strategic considerations. Our study highlights a novel aspect of the possibility of engaging in information manipulation, for instance, via propaganda, where the regime, despite being informed about its strength, falls into a trap of its own making.The second chapter, co-authored with Edmund Lou, shifts focus to coordination, scrutinizing the conditions under which a leader can successfully orchestrate collective action among followers with dispersed information. Our findings underscore a paradox wherein precise information held by followers can actually undermine efficient leadership, leading to potential miscoordination and inefficient outcomes. Through a global games model that features a leader and a team of followers, we demonstrate that both the signaling effect of the leader's actions and the followers' strategic uncertainty play critical roles in determining the success of coordination efforts. This analysis not only contributes to our understanding of leadership but also offers insights into the broader implications of information precision in strategic decision-making contexts.The third chapter, co-authored with Edmund Lou, explores the implications of information intermediation on consumer decision-making and market outcomes in the modern economy. By examining the strategic interaction between sellers, consumers, and information intermediaries in a screening model, we investigate how information disclosure choices by intermediaries can significantly influence product variety, consumer welfare, and market efficiency. Our results illustrate that as intermediaries place greater emphasis on consumer surplus over product quality, sellers are prompted to strategically expand their product range. Intriguingly, this augmented product variety decreases economic efficiency compared to scenarios where direct seller-to-consumer information provision is the norm. The role of information intermediaries proves pivotal in shaping consumer welfare, market profitability, and economic efficiency. Thus, our insights underscore the complexities introduced by these intermediaries that policymakers and market designers must consider when designing policies centered on consumer learning and information transparency.Collectively, this thesis offers a comprehensive analysis of information economics' applications across different domains. By integrating theoretical models with practical applications, it contributes to a deeper understanding of how information asymmetries and strategic information dissemination influence economic outcomes.
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653 $a Information asymmetries
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