國立虎尾科技大學 |

Management ownership and project choice : = Theory and evidence.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Management ownership and project choice :/
其他題名:	Theory and evidence.
作者:	Ezrielev, Jay.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (144 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 63-02, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International63-02A.
標題:	Studies. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780493187884

Management ownership and project choice : = Theory and evidence.
Ezrielev, Jay.

Management ownership and project choice :Theory and evidence. - 1 online resource (144 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 63-02, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2001.

Includes bibliographical references

The dissertation examines managerial incentives to invest in risky in projects. It is composed of three chapters. The first chapter formulates a model of project choice and performs an empirical investigation of the effects of management ownership on the selection of risky projects. The results suggest that the holdings of options by the top manager in a firm are associated with greater risk-taking and greater profit growth. No relationship is found between managerial share holdings and risky decisions or profit growth. The findings also indicate that the extent to which the top manager of a firm is secure in his job is positively related to the selection of risky projects as well as to the growth of profits. The second chapter examines the recent rise in options compensation. This trend in compensation coincides with the exceptionally high stock market returns. The proposed theory of managerial compensation and risky project choice explains both facts. It is shown that there may be multiple project investment equilibria. In one equilibrium managers will receive few stock options and will refrain from investing in risky projects, while under other equilibria managers will receive greater stock option compensation and will invest in risky projects more frequently. It was shown in the first chapter of the dissertation that risky projects tend to be more profitable. Therefore, the rise in both the stock market and the options compensation may be due to a transition from a low-risk investment equilibrium to a high-risk equilibrium. The third chapter investigates the role of venture capital in financing new businesses. In the proposed model managers of large firms avoid investing in risky projects because of the adverse career consequences of project failure. Venture capital firms aim to maximize the average return on investment and are thus willing to invest in risky projects. The theory suggests that large firms invest in large but safe projects, and venture capitalists invest in small but risky projects. This is what is actually observed.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780493187884Subjects--Topical Terms:

1437762
Studies.
Subjects--Index Terms:

AgencyIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Management ownership and project choice : = Theory and evidence.
LDR:03499ntm a22004217 4500 001 1148867
005 20240930105244.5
006 m o d
007 cr bn ---uuuuu
008 250605s2001 xx obm 000 0 eng d
020 $a 9780493187884
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI3009305
035 $a AAI3009305
040 $a MiAaPQ $b eng $c MiAaPQ $d NTU
100 1 $a Ezrielev, Jay. $3 1474946
245 1 0 $a Management ownership and project choice : $b Theory and evidence.
264 0 $c 2001
300 $a 1 online resource (144 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 63-02, Section: A.
500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
500 $a Advisor: Frydman, Roman.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2001.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a The dissertation examines managerial incentives to invest in risky in projects. It is composed of three chapters. The first chapter formulates a model of project choice and performs an empirical investigation of the effects of management ownership on the selection of risky projects. The results suggest that the holdings of options by the top manager in a firm are associated with greater risk-taking and greater profit growth. No relationship is found between managerial share holdings and risky decisions or profit growth. The findings also indicate that the extent to which the top manager of a firm is secure in his job is positively related to the selection of risky projects as well as to the growth of profits. The second chapter examines the recent rise in options compensation. This trend in compensation coincides with the exceptionally high stock market returns. The proposed theory of managerial compensation and risky project choice explains both facts. It is shown that there may be multiple project investment equilibria. In one equilibrium managers will receive few stock options and will refrain from investing in risky projects, while under other equilibria managers will receive greater stock option compensation and will invest in risky projects more frequently. It was shown in the first chapter of the dissertation that risky projects tend to be more profitable. Therefore, the rise in both the stock market and the options compensation may be due to a transition from a low-risk investment equilibrium to a high-risk equilibrium. The third chapter investigates the role of venture capital in financing new businesses. In the proposed model managers of large firms avoid investing in risky projects because of the adverse career consequences of project failure. Venture capital firms aim to maximize the average return on investment and are thus willing to invest in risky projects. The theory suggests that large firms invest in large but safe projects, and venture capitalists invest in small but risky projects. This is what is actually observed.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2024
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Studies. $3 1437762
650 4 $a Investments. $3 557691
650 4 $a Finance. $3 559073
653 $a Agency
653 $a Corporate governance
653 $a Executive compensation
653 $a Management
653 $a Ownership
653 $a Project choice
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0508
690 $a 0505
710 2 $a New York University. $3 1185263
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 63-02A.
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3009305 $z click for full text (PQDT)