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Essays in financial economics.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in financial economics./
作者:	Kovner, Anna R.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (152 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 70-03, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International70-03A.
標題:	Specialization. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780549613244

Essays in financial economics.
Kovner, Anna R.

Essays in financial economics. - 1 online resource (152 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 70-03, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2008.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation consists of three studies in empirical corporate finance. The first chapter, written jointly with Paul Gompers, Josh Lerner and David Scharfstein, is an empirical examination of cycles in the venture capital industry. In this chapter we examine how changes in public market signals affected venture capital investing between 1975 and 1998. We find that venture capitalists with the most industry experience increase their investments the most when public market signals become more favorable. Their reaction to an increase is greater than the reaction of venture capital organizations with relatively little industry experience and those with considerable experience but in other industries. The increase in investment rates does not affect the success of these transactions adversely to a significant extent. These findings are consistent with the view that venture capitalists rationally respond to attractive investment opportunities signaled by public market shifts. Chapter 2, written jointly with Victoria Ivashina, is an examination of the impact of leveraged buyout firms' bank relationships on the terms of their syndicated loans. Using a DealScan sample of 1,582 loans financing private equity sponsored leveraged buyouts between 1993 and 2005, we find that bank relationships explain cross-sectional variation in the loan interest rate and covenant structure. Our results indicate that two channels allow leveraged buyouts sponsored by private equity firms to receive favorable loan terms. First, bank relationships formed through repeated transactions reduce inefficiencies from information asymmetry between the lender and the leveraged buyout firm. Second, banks price loans to cross-sell other fee business. The last chapter examines differences in public and corporate pension plans' termination of external asset managers. Corporate pension plans terminate their external asset managers significantly more frequently than do public pension plans and are less likely to terminate managers in response to other corporate pensions' termination decisions. Despite these higher termination rates, corporate pension plans do not appear to select better performing external managers in publicly traded asset classes. I argue that differences in Chief Investment Officers' incentives can explain the difference in termination rates.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780549613244Subjects--Topical Terms:

1449774
Specialization.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Corporate financeIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Essays in financial economics.
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502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2008.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a This dissertation consists of three studies in empirical corporate finance. The first chapter, written jointly with Paul Gompers, Josh Lerner and David Scharfstein, is an empirical examination of cycles in the venture capital industry. In this chapter we examine how changes in public market signals affected venture capital investing between 1975 and 1998. We find that venture capitalists with the most industry experience increase their investments the most when public market signals become more favorable. Their reaction to an increase is greater than the reaction of venture capital organizations with relatively little industry experience and those with considerable experience but in other industries. The increase in investment rates does not affect the success of these transactions adversely to a significant extent. These findings are consistent with the view that venture capitalists rationally respond to attractive investment opportunities signaled by public market shifts. Chapter 2, written jointly with Victoria Ivashina, is an examination of the impact of leveraged buyout firms' bank relationships on the terms of their syndicated loans. Using a DealScan sample of 1,582 loans financing private equity sponsored leveraged buyouts between 1993 and 2005, we find that bank relationships explain cross-sectional variation in the loan interest rate and covenant structure. Our results indicate that two channels allow leveraged buyouts sponsored by private equity firms to receive favorable loan terms. First, bank relationships formed through repeated transactions reduce inefficiencies from information asymmetry between the lender and the leveraged buyout firm. Second, banks price loans to cross-sell other fee business. The last chapter examines differences in public and corporate pension plans' termination of external asset managers. Corporate pension plans terminate their external asset managers significantly more frequently than do public pension plans and are less likely to terminate managers in response to other corporate pensions' termination decisions. Despite these higher termination rates, corporate pension plans do not appear to select better performing external managers in publicly traded asset classes. I argue that differences in Chief Investment Officers' incentives can explain the difference in termination rates.
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