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Essays in Corporate Finance.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Corporate Finance./
作者:	Burkhardt, Frederick.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (112 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 73-12, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International73-12A.
標題:	Finance. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9781267342348

Essays in Corporate Finance.
Burkhardt, Frederick.

Essays in Corporate Finance. - 1 online resource (112 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 73-12, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2012.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation evaluates the economic incentives and actions of agents and monitors in change of control transactions. In chapter 1, I examine the information advantage and underpricing hypotheses to assess whether managers and directors work to secure fair prices for outside shareholders in leveraged buyout transactions involving private equity firms. I find that potentially conflicted managers act more in their proprietary capacity to themselves rather than their fiduciary capacity to outside shareholders. My results suggest that managers and private equity firms appear to be able to invest at low prices at the expense of shareholders, which has the potential to explain a large portion of private equity's outperformance of public equity since the 1990s. In chapter 2, I examine whether investment banks' objectivity and valuation assumptions are affected by the amount investment banks are paid in transactions in which they author fairness opinions. I find some evidence that investment banks that receive relatively higher payments provide wider acceptable valuation ranges in their fairness opinions. I also find evidence that banks that are relatively lowly paid produce assumptions in their fairness opinions which are inconsistent with standard financial theory and appear to target a particular price. My results suggest boards of directors select investment banks primarily to serve their own interests rather than for the benefit of shareholders.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9781267342348Subjects--Topical Terms:

559073
Finance.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Corporate financeIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Essays in Corporate Finance.
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500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 73-12, Section: A.
500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
500 $a Advisor: Petersen, Mitchell.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2012.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a This dissertation evaluates the economic incentives and actions of agents and monitors in change of control transactions. In chapter 1, I examine the information advantage and underpricing hypotheses to assess whether managers and directors work to secure fair prices for outside shareholders in leveraged buyout transactions involving private equity firms. I find that potentially conflicted managers act more in their proprietary capacity to themselves rather than their fiduciary capacity to outside shareholders. My results suggest that managers and private equity firms appear to be able to invest at low prices at the expense of shareholders, which has the potential to explain a large portion of private equity's outperformance of public equity since the 1990s. In chapter 2, I examine whether investment banks' objectivity and valuation assumptions are affected by the amount investment banks are paid in transactions in which they author fairness opinions. I find some evidence that investment banks that receive relatively higher payments provide wider acceptable valuation ranges in their fairness opinions. I also find evidence that banks that are relatively lowly paid produce assumptions in their fairness opinions which are inconsistent with standard financial theory and appear to target a particular price. My results suggest boards of directors select investment banks primarily to serve their own interests rather than for the benefit of shareholders.
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538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
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653 $a Corporate finance
653 $a Incentives
653 $a Investment banking
653 $a Principal agent
653 $a Private equity
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