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Essays on Innovation, Intellectual Property, Its Trade and Enforcement.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Innovation, Intellectual Property, Its Trade and Enforcement./
作者:	Alba, Tommaso.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (153 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-05, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-05A.
標題:	Patent law. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798380833837

Essays on Innovation, Intellectual Property, Its Trade and Enforcement.
Alba, Tommaso.

Essays on Innovation, Intellectual Property, Its Trade and Enforcement. - 1 online resource (153 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-05, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto (Canada), 2023.

Includes bibliographical references

In Chapter 1, I discuss Patent Assertion Entities (PAE) which are firms specialized in patent enforcement, and whose effect on innovation are theoretically ambiguous. I exploit a Supreme Court decision affecting PAEs incentives to file patent infringement lawsuits and cross-industry differences in exposure to empirically estimate the casual effect of PAE activity on innovative firms' performance. I find that the Supreme Court's ruling effectively discouraged PAEs' litigation and I show that sectors exposed to PAEs experienced a remarkable increase in their successful patent applications in response to the reduction of PAEs activity.Chapter 2 investigates the mechanism linking patent litigation and innovation. I develop a dynamic model of litigation where the defendant screens out heterogeneous plaintiffs through a series of out-of-court settlement offers. Employing granular information on patent infringement cases filed in the US from 2007-2021, I estimate my model. I find that patent litigation costs over $48.8 billion a year to listed defendants, $24.7 billion of which from settlement transfers. Furthermore, cases filed by PAEs have smaller stakes, lower quality, and are more likely to settle for smaller amounts. I consider two counterfactuals. First, I introduce a conditional fee-shifting rule, finding it effective in discouraging frivolous litigation, but likely to induce costly delays. Then, I turn to forum shopping, finding that restricting plaintiffs' discretionality in the choice of venue would dramatically reduce the incentives to file low-quality cases.Finally, Chapter 3 investigates systematic acquisitions of startups, which are prevalent in digital markets. I introduce a model of competition where demand depends substantially on the quality ranking of incumbents, which can be improved by R&D or acquisitions. I find that the prospect of acquisitions incentivizes startups investments when the incumbents are engaged in a neck-and-neck technological race, however these incentives fade as the leader escapes competition. Hence, when network externalities are strong enough, a forward-looking industry leader has significant incentives to lock the industry in a state of stagnation, where startups' investments are low, and killer acquisitions are prevalent.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798380833837Subjects--Topical Terms:

1180559
Patent law.
Subjects--Index Terms:

AcquisitionsIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Essays on Innovation, Intellectual Property, Its Trade and Enforcement.
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504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a In Chapter 1, I discuss Patent Assertion Entities (PAE) which are firms specialized in patent enforcement, and whose effect on innovation are theoretically ambiguous. I exploit a Supreme Court decision affecting PAEs incentives to file patent infringement lawsuits and cross-industry differences in exposure to empirically estimate the casual effect of PAE activity on innovative firms' performance. I find that the Supreme Court's ruling effectively discouraged PAEs' litigation and I show that sectors exposed to PAEs experienced a remarkable increase in their successful patent applications in response to the reduction of PAEs activity.Chapter 2 investigates the mechanism linking patent litigation and innovation. I develop a dynamic model of litigation where the defendant screens out heterogeneous plaintiffs through a series of out-of-court settlement offers. Employing granular information on patent infringement cases filed in the US from 2007-2021, I estimate my model. I find that patent litigation costs over $48.8 billion a year to listed defendants, $24.7 billion of which from settlement transfers. Furthermore, cases filed by PAEs have smaller stakes, lower quality, and are more likely to settle for smaller amounts. I consider two counterfactuals. First, I introduce a conditional fee-shifting rule, finding it effective in discouraging frivolous litigation, but likely to induce costly delays. Then, I turn to forum shopping, finding that restricting plaintiffs' discretionality in the choice of venue would dramatically reduce the incentives to file low-quality cases.Finally, Chapter 3 investigates systematic acquisitions of startups, which are prevalent in digital markets. I introduce a model of competition where demand depends substantially on the quality ranking of incumbents, which can be improved by R&D or acquisitions. I find that the prospect of acquisitions incentivizes startups investments when the incumbents are engaged in a neck-and-neck technological race, however these incentives fade as the leader escapes competition. Hence, when network externalities are strong enough, a forward-looking industry leader has significant incentives to lock the industry in a state of stagnation, where startups' investments are low, and killer acquisitions are prevalent.
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653 $a Innovation
653 $a Litigation
653 $a Patent trolls
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