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Absence in Nyaya and Mimaṃsa.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Absence in Nyaya and Mimaṃsa./
作者:	Beaulieu, Jack.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (143 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-09, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International84-09A.
標題:	Epistemology. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798377615989

Absence in Nyaya and Mimaṃsa.
Beaulieu, Jack.

Absence in Nyaya and Mimaṃsa. - 1 online resource (143 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-09, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto (Canada), 2023.

Includes bibliographical references

I examine competing views from Nyaya and Mimaṃsa philosophers about the epistemology of absence, which asks how we learn that an object or property is absent. In particular, I examine Nyaya defenses of, and Mimaṃsa challenges to, perceptualism, according to which we learn that an object or property is absent (abhava) by perceiving (pratyakṣa) its absence.In the first chapter, I introduce cases of past absence (praṅnastitasthala), purported counterexamples to perceptualism which involve agents learning in retrospect that an object or property was absent. I identify two groups of views about these cases: recollection views, according to which cases of past absence involve agents recalling negative information; and recollection failure views, according to which cases of past absence involve agents failing to recall positive information. I reconstruct two recollection views: a Bhaṭṭa view belonging to Uṃveka, and a Nyaya view belonging to Jayanta and Bhasarvajna. I then examine Salikanatha and Sucarita's critiques of recollection views.In the second chapter, I examine recollection failure views. I introduce the Bhaṭṭa philosopher Parthasarathi's view, following which I reconstruct the Nyaya philosopher Gaṅgesa's critiques. Gaṅgesa defends a similar view to Parthasarathi's that mends its difficulties and secures a perceptualist explanation of past absence. According to Gaṅgesa, agents learn that a recollectable (smaraṇarha) object or property was absent by inferring its past absence from failing to recall (asmaraṇa) that object or property.In the third chapter, I examine the Nyaya philosopher Raghunatha's attack on a condition according to which we are always aware of an absence as an absence of its counterpositive (pratiyogin), or its corresponding absent object or property. Gaṅgesa defends this condition, showing that it is supported by a plausible thesis about the epistemology of relational properties and motivates the Nyaya defence of absence as irreducible to a positive. But Raghunatha identifies cases in which the condition fails.Finally, I provide a translation of, and commentary on, a selection from the Pramaṇaparayaṇa by the Prabhakara philosopher Salikanatha. I argue that he defends a reductionist metaphysics according to which absence reduces to an awareness-event (buddhi), and knowledge of absence thereby reduces to self-knowledge.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798377615989Subjects--Topical Terms:

671538
Epistemology.
Subjects--Index Terms:

EpistemologyIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Absence in Nyaya and Mimaṃsa.
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520 $a I examine competing views from Nyaya and Mimaṃsa philosophers about the epistemology of absence, which asks how we learn that an object or property is absent. In particular, I examine Nyaya defenses of, and Mimaṃsa challenges to, perceptualism, according to which we learn that an object or property is absent (abhava) by perceiving (pratyakṣa) its absence.In the first chapter, I introduce cases of past absence (praṅnastitasthala), purported counterexamples to perceptualism which involve agents learning in retrospect that an object or property was absent. I identify two groups of views about these cases: recollection views, according to which cases of past absence involve agents recalling negative information; and recollection failure views, according to which cases of past absence involve agents failing to recall positive information. I reconstruct two recollection views: a Bhaṭṭa view belonging to Uṃveka, and a Nyaya view belonging to Jayanta and Bhasarvajna. I then examine Salikanatha and Sucarita's critiques of recollection views.In the second chapter, I examine recollection failure views. I introduce the Bhaṭṭa philosopher Parthasarathi's view, following which I reconstruct the Nyaya philosopher Gaṅgesa's critiques. Gaṅgesa defends a similar view to Parthasarathi's that mends its difficulties and secures a perceptualist explanation of past absence. According to Gaṅgesa, agents learn that a recollectable (smaraṇarha) object or property was absent by inferring its past absence from failing to recall (asmaraṇa) that object or property.In the third chapter, I examine the Nyaya philosopher Raghunatha's attack on a condition according to which we are always aware of an absence as an absence of its counterpositive (pratiyogin), or its corresponding absent object or property. Gaṅgesa defends this condition, showing that it is supported by a plausible thesis about the epistemology of relational properties and motivates the Nyaya defence of absence as irreducible to a positive. But Raghunatha identifies cases in which the condition fails.Finally, I provide a translation of, and commentary on, a selection from the Pramaṇaparayaṇa by the Prabhakara philosopher Salikanatha. I argue that he defends a reductionist metaphysics according to which absence reduces to an awareness-event (buddhi), and knowledge of absence thereby reduces to self-knowledge.
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