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Evading Electoral Accountability : = How Elites Maintain Voter Support in Contexts of Corruption.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Evading Electoral Accountability :/
Reminder of title:	How Elites Maintain Voter Support in Contexts of Corruption.
Author:	Elia, Emily.
Description:	1 online resource (249 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-02, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International86-02A.
Subject:	Political science. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798383415122

Evading Electoral Accountability : = How Elites Maintain Voter Support in Contexts of Corruption.
Elia, Emily.

Evading Electoral Accountability :How Elites Maintain Voter Support in Contexts of Corruption. - 1 online resource (249 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-02, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Rice University, 2024.

Includes bibliographical references

What strategies do elites use to evade accountability for corruption, and what are the consequences for voter loyalty in Latin America? To date, most studies examine electoral accountability from voters' perspectives exclusively. However, whether electoral accountability will occur can depend on elite behavior, particularly an elite's ability to evade accountability. My dissertation flips the concept of electoral accountability-historically emphasizing voters' agency-on its head by asking what elites do to escape accountability for malfeasance. In three papers, I investigate three strategies that corrupt elites use to ensure continued voter loyalty: "competency compensation," "feminization," and "anticorruption appeals." First, I examine how voters respond to elites using competency in political performance areas to compensate for corruption. Using a conjoint experiment in Argentina, I test if corrupt candidates with greater levels of competency across six performance areas maintain more voter support than incompetent candidates. Second, I study whether political parties run more female candidates after a corruption scandal in order to diminish electoral backlash due to common voter perceptions that women are less corrupt than men. I field a survey experiment in Mexico, Guatemala, Uruguay, and Chile to test if voters actually prefer female candidates after a corruption scandal. Third, I explore which legislators are more likely to sponsor anticorruption legislation and when. I argue that anticorruption work is strategically prioritized by opposition legislators, and I test these expectations with bill proposal data and elite interviews from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. Overall, this research shows that elites in some contexts evade accountability successfully by demonstrating competency in select performance areas. I also find that engagement with anticorruption legislation is a strategic choice made largely by opposition elites when corruption becomes highly salient to voters. Elevating women to candidacies after corruption succeeds in dampening electoral accountability only in contexts where women are strongly associated with being less corrupt. By better understanding how corrupt elites in Latin America can maintain voter loyalty despite their malfeasance, researchers and anticorruption practitioners can develop more effective responses to corruption that strengthen electoral accountability even in the face of elites' attempts to weaken it.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798383415122Subjects--Topical Terms:

558774
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Comparative politicsIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Evading Electoral Accountability : = How Elites Maintain Voter Support in Contexts of Corruption.
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