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Institutions of the Weak : = Rebel Institutions and the Prospects of Peace After Civil War.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Institutions of the Weak :/
Reminder of title:	Rebel Institutions and the Prospects of Peace After Civil War.
Author:	Albert, Karen Elizabeth.
Description:	1 online resource (232 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-03, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International82-03A.
Subject:	Political science. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798672119137

Institutions of the Weak : = Rebel Institutions and the Prospects of Peace After Civil War.
Albert, Karen Elizabeth.

Institutions of the Weak :Rebel Institutions and the Prospects of Peace After Civil War. - 1 online resource (232 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-03, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Rochester, 2020.

Includes bibliographical references

Rebels govern. But, what is the range of institutions used in rebel governance? Why do rebels divert resources from their fighting capability to governance institutions and what effect do these institutions have on the peaceful settlement of civil war? It is widely ac- cepted that rebels engage in governance activities during conflict, but our understanding of rebel governance has been limited by a lack of data on the institutions that rebels provide over time. In this dissertation, I use new data on rebel governance institutions to explore these questions. I introduce a new dataset, the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset, which covers 235 rebel groups and codes annually for 25 institutions during the entire existence of the group.I argue that two dimensions of ideology, state-building and societal transformation, deter- mine the type of institutions rebels create. Rebels who seek to build a new state, either in form or function, will value institutions more than rebels who are not state-building. Rebels whose ideology includes societal transformation value justice and local government more than education and parallel governments. These institutions give rebels direct control over civilian behavior, and can shape the norms of society, which is vital for societal transformation.Having established what drives rebels' strategic selection of institutions, the third chapter asks what effects these institutions have on achieving peace after civil war. Rebel institutions, particularly service provision, are thought to make negotiations more successful. I show that this positive association does not hold. The well-established literature on com- mitment problems would suggest that negotiated settlements are not reached because gov- ernments end negotiations amidst fears of rebel growth from civilian support derived from service provision. I offer an alternative explanation, strategic stalling, based on rebel incen- tives to realize the full long-term benefits of service provision. Using qualitative evidence to differentiate between these two possible mechanisms, I show that rebel commitment problems are unlikely to explain the negative correlation, but observable implications of strategic stalling are observed in the cases surveyed.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798672119137Subjects--Topical Terms:

558774
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Civil WarIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Institutions of the Weak : = Rebel Institutions and the Prospects of Peace After Civil War.
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520 $a Rebels govern. But, what is the range of institutions used in rebel governance? Why do rebels divert resources from their fighting capability to governance institutions and what effect do these institutions have on the peaceful settlement of civil war? It is widely ac- cepted that rebels engage in governance activities during conflict, but our understanding of rebel governance has been limited by a lack of data on the institutions that rebels provide over time. In this dissertation, I use new data on rebel governance institutions to explore these questions. I introduce a new dataset, the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset, which covers 235 rebel groups and codes annually for 25 institutions during the entire existence of the group.I argue that two dimensions of ideology, state-building and societal transformation, deter- mine the type of institutions rebels create. Rebels who seek to build a new state, either in form or function, will value institutions more than rebels who are not state-building. Rebels whose ideology includes societal transformation value justice and local government more than education and parallel governments. These institutions give rebels direct control over civilian behavior, and can shape the norms of society, which is vital for societal transformation.Having established what drives rebels' strategic selection of institutions, the third chapter asks what effects these institutions have on achieving peace after civil war. Rebel institutions, particularly service provision, are thought to make negotiations more successful. I show that this positive association does not hold. The well-established literature on com- mitment problems would suggest that negotiated settlements are not reached because gov- ernments end negotiations amidst fears of rebel growth from civilian support derived from service provision. I offer an alternative explanation, strategic stalling, based on rebel incen- tives to realize the full long-term benefits of service provision. Using qualitative evidence to differentiate between these two possible mechanisms, I show that rebel commitment problems are unlikely to explain the negative correlation, but observable implications of strategic stalling are observed in the cases surveyed.
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