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Strategic Repression of Political Dissidents in Authoritarian Regimes : = A Comparative Analysis of Russia and Belarus.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Strategic Repression of Political Dissidents in Authoritarian Regimes :/
其他題名:	A Comparative Analysis of Russia and Belarus.
作者:	Winns, Desiree.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (72 pages)
附註:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International85-11.
標題:	International law. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798382768366

Strategic Repression of Political Dissidents in Authoritarian Regimes : = A Comparative Analysis of Russia and Belarus.
Winns, Desiree.

Strategic Repression of Political Dissidents in Authoritarian Regimes :A Comparative Analysis of Russia and Belarus. - 1 online resource (72 pages)

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11.

Thesis (M.A.)--The George Washington University, 2024.

Includes bibliographical references

This thesis explores the decision calculus behind individual level repressions in Russia and Belarus. Specifically focusing on case studies of political figures, journalists and civilians/activists, the research determines that Vladimir Putin and Alexander Lukashenko wait to kill individuals who resist their regimes to take advantage of other forms of repression, such as imprisonment or exile. To discourage elite betrayal, which is a greater threat to both authoritarians, former inner circle members face more gruesome forms of repression, while oppositional figures only become bigger threats once they possess information, resources, or connections that are equivalent to that of an inner circle member. Bureaucratic enthusiasm amongst security circles in Russia and Belarus also contributes to the targeting of individuals, whether to impress supervisors, unleash personal grudges, or create "preventative" measures. Since death can only be used once against a dissident, authoritarians wait for moments and methods that will best project an intended message to international or domestic watchers. Finally, the political paranoia of betrayal, inherited from the Soviet Union, is prevalent in the pursuit and prosecution of traitors. However, in Russia and Belarus, betrayal is perceived as any action taken by any person who speaks for or represents an alternative to the regime.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798382768366Subjects--Topical Terms:

557047
International law.
Subjects--Index Terms:

BelarusIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Strategic Repression of Political Dissidents in Authoritarian Regimes : = A Comparative Analysis of Russia and Belarus.
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