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Budgeting and Psychological Motivations in Sales Management.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Budgeting and Psychological Motivations in Sales Management./
作者:	Waiser, Rob.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (102 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International79-01A.
標題:	Literature reviews. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9781369854053

Budgeting and Psychological Motivations in Sales Management.
Waiser, Rob.

Budgeting and Psychological Motivations in Sales Management. - 1 online resource (102 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto (Canada), 2016.

Includes bibliographical references

Sales force incentives are used to motivate, control, and reward salespeople, and represent a substantial expenditure for many firms. In this dissertation, I examine the role that sales managers play in setting budgets for sales force incentives and I investigate how public recognition of performance in sales contests (a common form of incentive) affects salespeople's motivations. The standard analytical models used in the literature on sales force incentives consist of a firm and a salesperson, with sales managers assumed (often implicitly) to be interchangeable with the firm. In my first study, I treat sales managers as distinct from their firms, in both their objectives and their information. I use this model to explore why many firms allow managers to participate in setting budgets for their salespeople's incentives despite the apparent conflict of interest that results. I show that allowing such participation can be beneficial when it reveals useful information about the manager's salesperson or their territory. I then propose a budget-setting approach that reveals such information and identify the conditions under which it is feasible and optimal. In my next study, I consider alternative solutions to the challenge of revealing a sales manager's private information about her salespeople or territories. In particular, I examine how the manager's own compensation can be designed for this purpose. This can be achieved by offering the manager a menu of contracts, each consisting of a compensation plan for the manager and a budget constraint within which the manager must design the salesperson's compensation plan. In my final study, a joint work with Tanjim Hossain and Mengze Shi, I use a combination of analytical modeling and laboratory experiments to investigate how a salesperson's psychological motivations re affected by the design of a sales contest. I am primarily interested in the public disclosure of contest results, such as the names and/or ranks of winners and losers. I find that recognizing winners generates positive psychological motivations, but that the relative performance of particular disclosure approaches can depend on the contest prize structure.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9781369854053Subjects--Topical Terms:

1372466
Literature reviews.
Subjects--Index Terms:

BudgetingIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Budgeting and Psychological Motivations in Sales Management.
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500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
500 $a Advisor: Shi, Mengze.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto (Canada), 2016.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Sales force incentives are used to motivate, control, and reward salespeople, and represent a substantial expenditure for many firms. In this dissertation, I examine the role that sales managers play in setting budgets for sales force incentives and I investigate how public recognition of performance in sales contests (a common form of incentive) affects salespeople's motivations. The standard analytical models used in the literature on sales force incentives consist of a firm and a salesperson, with sales managers assumed (often implicitly) to be interchangeable with the firm. In my first study, I treat sales managers as distinct from their firms, in both their objectives and their information. I use this model to explore why many firms allow managers to participate in setting budgets for their salespeople's incentives despite the apparent conflict of interest that results. I show that allowing such participation can be beneficial when it reveals useful information about the manager's salesperson or their territory. I then propose a budget-setting approach that reveals such information and identify the conditions under which it is feasible and optimal. In my next study, I consider alternative solutions to the challenge of revealing a sales manager's private information about her salespeople or territories. In particular, I examine how the manager's own compensation can be designed for this purpose. This can be achieved by offering the manager a menu of contracts, each consisting of a compensation plan for the manager and a budget constraint within which the manager must design the salesperson's compensation plan. In my final study, a joint work with Tanjim Hossain and Mengze Shi, I use a combination of analytical modeling and laboratory experiments to investigate how a salesperson's psychological motivations re affected by the design of a sales contest. I am primarily interested in the public disclosure of contest results, such as the names and/or ranks of winners and losers. I find that recognizing winners generates positive psychological motivations, but that the relative performance of particular disclosure approaches can depend on the contest prize structure.
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538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
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650 4 $a Dissertations & theses. $3 1372732
650 4 $a Participation. $3 807242
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653 $a Lobbying
653 $a Recognition programs
653 $a Sales contests
653 $a Sales force compensation
653 $a Sales management
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710 2 $a University of Toronto (Canada). $b Management. $3 1179118
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