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Two Essays on Non-GAAP Reporting.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Two Essays on Non-GAAP Reporting./
作者:	Hinton, Matthew.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (187 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-01, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-01A.
標題:	Finance. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798379894412

Two Essays on Non-GAAP Reporting.
Hinton, Matthew.

Two Essays on Non-GAAP Reporting. - 1 online resource (187 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-01, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Hawai'i at Manoa, 2023.

Includes bibliographical references

This study examines whether an investigation by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) affects a firm's non-GAAP reporting choices and a potential mechanism for the effect, Turnover-Performance Sensitivity (TPS). Using a list of all closed SEC investigations between January 1, 2000 and August 2, 2017 provided by Blackburne et al. (2021), I examine my research question. I find that, when under an SEC investigation, firms with opportunistic motives increase their non-GAAP reporting, while those with informative motives reduce their opportunistic non-GAAP reporting. Further, I find TPS increases for firms with opportunistic motives that are under investigation and that opportunistic non-GAAP reporting choices exacerbate this effect. Opportunistic firms also have less persistent non-GAAP earnings during an SEC investigation. Conversely, firms with informative motives do not see such a change to TPS. I also find that the effect of an investigation on opportunistic reporting is stronger for (i) informative firms in the post-financial crisis period, (ii) firms that have a high level of financial expertise on the board of directors and the nomination committee, (iii) firms with dual board chair-CEO positions, and (iv) firms with low Earnings Response Coefficients (ERC). This paper has implications for regulators and investors, as my research shows that SEC interventions have unintended consequences related to opportunistic non-GAAP reporting and managers' career prospects.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798379894412Subjects--Topical Terms:

559073
Finance.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Disclosure prominenceIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Two Essays on Non-GAAP Reporting.
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500 $a Advisor: Zhou, Jian.
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504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a This study examines whether an investigation by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) affects a firm's non-GAAP reporting choices and a potential mechanism for the effect, Turnover-Performance Sensitivity (TPS). Using a list of all closed SEC investigations between January 1, 2000 and August 2, 2017 provided by Blackburne et al. (2021), I examine my research question. I find that, when under an SEC investigation, firms with opportunistic motives increase their non-GAAP reporting, while those with informative motives reduce their opportunistic non-GAAP reporting. Further, I find TPS increases for firms with opportunistic motives that are under investigation and that opportunistic non-GAAP reporting choices exacerbate this effect. Opportunistic firms also have less persistent non-GAAP earnings during an SEC investigation. Conversely, firms with informative motives do not see such a change to TPS. I also find that the effect of an investigation on opportunistic reporting is stronger for (i) informative firms in the post-financial crisis period, (ii) firms that have a high level of financial expertise on the board of directors and the nomination committee, (iii) firms with dual board chair-CEO positions, and (iv) firms with low Earnings Response Coefficients (ERC). This paper has implications for regulators and investors, as my research shows that SEC interventions have unintended consequences related to opportunistic non-GAAP reporting and managers' career prospects.
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