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Spirited Motivations, Virtue, & the Good : = The Interdependence of Spirited Motivations and Rational Beliefs in Plato's Moral Psychology.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Spirited Motivations, Virtue, & the Good :/
Reminder of title:	The Interdependence of Spirited Motivations and Rational Beliefs in Plato's Moral Psychology.
Author:	Zgurich, Brianna Marie.
Description:	1 online resource (219 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-03, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-03B.
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798380313025

Spirited Motivations, Virtue, & the Good : = The Interdependence of Spirited Motivations and Rational Beliefs in Plato's Moral Psychology.
Zgurich, Brianna Marie.

Spirited Motivations, Virtue, & the Good :The Interdependence of Spirited Motivations and Rational Beliefs in Plato's Moral Psychology. - 1 online resource (219 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-03, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Cornell University, 2023.

Includes bibliographical references

Confidence, courage, and shame are typically agreed upon by scholars to be what Plato refers to in his middle dialogues as spirited (thumoeidic) motivations; i.e., strong emotional responses that are not themselves rational (i.e., not calculating about what is best), nor appetitive (i.e., about bodily objects of desire such as food, drink, and sex). This dissertation focuses on courage and shame in particular. While courage finds itself as one of Plato's four cardinal virtues (along with wisdom, moderation, and justice), shame, a particularly strong passion that can result in either virtuous or non-virtuous responses, is not quite so easy to place. Further the roles of these two motivations for virtuous action, along with their connection to reason, are not fully appreciated by scholars. I argue that we can use the psychology of Plato's final dialogue the Laws, and especially the famous "puppet passage", to understand what these "spirited motivations". I have found that these motivations are especially closely linked to reason-not only in following reason but also in enabling reason's best condition: wisdom. Along the way, I address some of the early and middle dialogues, arguing that the speech of the laws in the Crito appeals to shame (before those who share one's conception of the good), and that such shame is crucial to Socrates' elenchus; however, whether the elenchus succeeds at getting the refuted party to seek knowledge or to avoid the shame by bringing down others (as in the Apology and also the Laches) depends on the person's conception of the good. Further, I argue that the myth of the Protagoras depicts shame's role as reason-dependent and, for that reason, is conducive to political community. Finally, I argue that courage in the Republic, understood as belief-preservation, is crucial for the development of reason's best condition: wisdom. So, using the Laws as a framework, I argue that we can recognize the interdependence of courage and shame with rational beliefs for virtuous action, answer questions that arise from some of the early and middle Platonic dialogues, as well as see a consistent, complex, and unique moral psychology emerge from Plato's corpus.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798380313025Subjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

AischuneIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Spirited Motivations, Virtue, & the Good : = The Interdependence of Spirited Motivations and Rational Beliefs in Plato's Moral Psychology.
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