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Rulers and Producers : = How State Interventions Shape the Political Economy of Production.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Rulers and Producers :/
Reminder of title:	How State Interventions Shape the Political Economy of Production.
Author:	Riddler, Griffin.
Description:	1 online resource (223 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-03, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-03A.
Subject:	Political science. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798380346252

Rulers and Producers : = How State Interventions Shape the Political Economy of Production.
Riddler, Griffin.

Rulers and Producers :How State Interventions Shape the Political Economy of Production. - 1 online resource (223 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-03, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duke University, 2023.

Includes bibliographical references

States play an important role in structuring the production process. I examine three different types of state interventions and their subsequent effects on how firms, as the organizers of production, operate. I argue that existing theories of state intervention abstract away from important facets of how production is organized in modern industrial societies. By explicitly defining the firm as the unit of production, I outline several different avenues for state power to meaningfully shift how production inputs and outputs are allocated, showcasing three in particular with a focus on contemporary China.First, I find that states can utilize their ownership stake in industrial firms to better assess and collect taxes from industrial firms. This ownership stake can substitute for other more traditional tax bureaucracies, and also gives states the power to achieve political goals via the production process rather than tax-and-spend policies. Second, I show that political purges in authoritarian countries can reduce theft by private firm controllers by reducing the flow of government subsidies to private firms and thereby imposing fiscal discipline on firm controllers. Finally, I highlight the limits of state intervention, showing that even massive political shocks can have little effect on long-run distributions of human capital and productive labor.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798380346252Subjects--Topical Terms:

558774
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

ChinaIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Rulers and Producers : = How State Interventions Shape the Political Economy of Production.
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504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a States play an important role in structuring the production process. I examine three different types of state interventions and their subsequent effects on how firms, as the organizers of production, operate. I argue that existing theories of state intervention abstract away from important facets of how production is organized in modern industrial societies. By explicitly defining the firm as the unit of production, I outline several different avenues for state power to meaningfully shift how production inputs and outputs are allocated, showcasing three in particular with a focus on contemporary China.First, I find that states can utilize their ownership stake in industrial firms to better assess and collect taxes from industrial firms. This ownership stake can substitute for other more traditional tax bureaucracies, and also gives states the power to achieve political goals via the production process rather than tax-and-spend policies. Second, I show that political purges in authoritarian countries can reduce theft by private firm controllers by reducing the flow of government subsidies to private firms and thereby imposing fiscal discipline on firm controllers. Finally, I highlight the limits of state intervention, showing that even massive political shocks can have little effect on long-run distributions of human capital and productive labor.
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653 $a Ownership stake
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