國立虎尾科技大學 |

Design of Pre-Formed Resistive Random Access Memory-Based Physical Unclonable Functions for Hardware Security Applications /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Design of Pre-Formed Resistive Random Access Memory-Based Physical Unclonable Functions for Hardware Security Applications // Taylor Joshua Wilson.
作者:	Wilson, Taylor Joshua,
面頁冊數:	1 electronic resource (132 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-11B.
標題:	Computer engineering. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31295649
ISBN:	9798382756509

Design of Pre-Formed Resistive Random Access Memory-Based Physical Unclonable Functions for Hardware Security Applications /
Wilson, Taylor Joshua,

Design of Pre-Formed Resistive Random Access Memory-Based Physical Unclonable Functions for Hardware Security Applications /Taylor Joshua Wilson. - 1 electronic resource (132 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-11, Section: B.

The competitive landscape in emerging nonvolatile memories, encompassing Resistive Random Access Memory (ReRAM), Ferroelectric Random Access Memory (FeRAM), and Magnetoresistive Random Access Memory (MRAM), is driven by continuous research and development efforts aimed at surpassing the limitations of traditional Flash and Dynamic Random Access Memory. Focus on scalability and latency improvements; these technologies can already replace existing memory solutions, contributing to a race for dominance in future storage and computing applications, including neural computing, in which the cells are used to design artificial neurons. Alongside the advancement of new memories, there are unprecedented opportunities to design a new generation of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) based on these technologies.This dissertation introduces a novel hardware security solution that leverages the physical properties of pre-formed ReRAM to design PUFs. By injecting small electric currents into the cells, resistances in the pre-forming range exhibit large cell-to-cell variations, enabling the generation of quasi-infinite reliable digital fingerprints from the same array. One of the priorities of this research effort is to design PUFs offering a robust defense against tampering attacks, hiding digital secrets even when exposed to side-channel attacks. Importantly, the design operates in a range that does not disturb the cells; unlike what is done by permanently forming conductive filaments and the SET/RESET program/erase processes, this design does not modify the resistance of each cell permanently.Our research involves the comprehensive characterization of pre-formed ReRAM as PUFs, exploring properties such as sensitivity to tampering and the possibility of adding a self-destruct mode. The arrays are tested for repeated read cycles, extreme operating temperatures, and aging, with variations and drift rates quantified to assess reliability. Experimental results demonstrate near-ideal PUF characteristics with high reliability. The sensitivity to tampering, defined as the ability to detect tampering attacks, is established through extended current sweeps to identify suitable operating ranges before significant breakdown. PUF benchmarks are reported.The sensitivity scheme reveals that at least 91% of the cells can generate keys protected by the scheme up to 5.5 uA, while 22% of the sensing elements are triggered. Additionally, the cells were characterized for high Voltage sweeps to enable on-demand irreversible damaging of the PUFs. A fixed Voltage of 1.9 V renders the entire array useless as a pre-formed-based PUF, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of the device if lost to an opponent.The performance evaluation is conducted on 180-nm Al2O3 ReRAM technology, presenting a promising hardware-based security solution for protecting confidential information in the Internet of Things devices. This research has potential applications in diverse domains that require robust protection against unauthorized access and tampering.

English

ISBN: 9798382756509Subjects--Topical Terms:

569006
Computer engineering.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Bit error rates

Design of Pre-Formed Resistive Random Access Memory-Based Physical Unclonable Functions for Hardware Security Applications /
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520 $a The competitive landscape in emerging nonvolatile memories, encompassing Resistive Random Access Memory (ReRAM), Ferroelectric Random Access Memory (FeRAM), and Magnetoresistive Random Access Memory (MRAM), is driven by continuous research and development efforts aimed at surpassing the limitations of traditional Flash and Dynamic Random Access Memory. Focus on scalability and latency improvements; these technologies can already replace existing memory solutions, contributing to a race for dominance in future storage and computing applications, including neural computing, in which the cells are used to design artificial neurons. Alongside the advancement of new memories, there are unprecedented opportunities to design a new generation of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) based on these technologies.This dissertation introduces a novel hardware security solution that leverages the physical properties of pre-formed ReRAM to design PUFs. By injecting small electric currents into the cells, resistances in the pre-forming range exhibit large cell-to-cell variations, enabling the generation of quasi-infinite reliable digital fingerprints from the same array. One of the priorities of this research effort is to design PUFs offering a robust defense against tampering attacks, hiding digital secrets even when exposed to side-channel attacks. Importantly, the design operates in a range that does not disturb the cells; unlike what is done by permanently forming conductive filaments and the SET/RESET program/erase processes, this design does not modify the resistance of each cell permanently.Our research involves the comprehensive characterization of pre-formed ReRAM as PUFs, exploring properties such as sensitivity to tampering and the possibility of adding a self-destruct mode. The arrays are tested for repeated read cycles, extreme operating temperatures, and aging, with variations and drift rates quantified to assess reliability. Experimental results demonstrate near-ideal PUF characteristics with high reliability. The sensitivity to tampering, defined as the ability to detect tampering attacks, is established through extended current sweeps to identify suitable operating ranges before significant breakdown. PUF benchmarks are reported.The sensitivity scheme reveals that at least 91% of the cells can generate keys protected by the scheme up to 5.5 uA, while 22% of the sensing elements are triggered. Additionally, the cells were characterized for high Voltage sweeps to enable on-demand irreversible damaging of the PUFs. A fixed Voltage of 1.9 V renders the entire array useless as a pre-formed-based PUF, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of the device if lost to an opponent.The performance evaluation is conducted on 180-nm Al2O3 ReRAM technology, presenting a promising hardware-based security solution for protecting confidential information in the Internet of Things devices. This research has potential applications in diverse domains that require robust protection against unauthorized access and tampering.
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650 4 $a Information science. $3 561178
650 4 $a Nanotechnology. $3 557660
650 4 $a Electrical engineering. $3 596380
653 $a Bit error rates
653 $a Cybersecurity
653 $a Hardware security
653 $a Performance metrics
653 $a Physical Unclonable Functions
653 $a Resistive Random Access Memory
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