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Knowledge in the world = epistemic vulnerability, verisimilitude, and truth /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Knowledge in the world/ by Óscar L. González-Castán.
其他題名:	epistemic vulnerability, verisimilitude, and truth /
作者:	González-Castán, Óscar L.
出版者:	Cham :Springer Nature Switzerland : : 2025.,
面頁冊數:	xxviii, 347 p. :ill., digital ; : 24 cm.;
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Knowledge, Theory of. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-09022-5
ISBN:	9783032090225

Knowledge in the world = epistemic vulnerability, verisimilitude, and truth /
González-Castán, Óscar L.

Knowledge in the worldepistemic vulnerability, verisimilitude, and truth /[electronic resource] :by Óscar L. González-Castán. - Cham :Springer Nature Switzerland :2025. - xxviii, 347 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - Synthese library. Studies in epistemology, logic, methodology, and philosophy of science,v. 5322542-8292 ;. - Synthese library.Studies in epistemology, logic, methodology, and philosophy of science ;v. 487..

Introduction -- Part I: Epistemic Vulnerability and Its Consequences -- 2 Epistemic Vulnerability: Between Fallibilism and Epistemic Success -- 3 The "New" Plato (I): The Second Voyage of Philosophy on Truth and the Strongest Discourses -- 4 The "New" Plato (II): A Pragmatist Conception of the Role of Our Strongest Discourses -- 5 Epistemic Verisimilitude: Structural Elements -- 6 Epistemic Verisimilitude, Justification, and Truth -- Part II: Increasing Degrees of Epistemic Verisimilitude -- 7 Epistemic Verisimilitude and Asymmetric Fallibilism -- 8 The Sources of the Increasing Epistemic Verisimilitude of our Theories -- 9 Increasing Epistemic Verisimilitude and the Relay Race Problem -- 10 A Historically Accurate Epistemic Grinder Machine -- 11 The Flaws of Realism and Antirealism -- 12 A Critique of Chakravartty's Requirements for Semirealism -- Epilogue -- Index.

This book proposes a new set of concepts in epistemology and philosophy of science and provides a novel account of theory change using the notions of epistemic vulnerability, asymmetric fallibilism, and epistemic verisimilitude in a non-Popperian sense. The examination of the notion of epistemic vulnerability is inspired by a dissatisfaction with classical fallibilism as it unnecessarily emphasizes the possibility of error rather than the possibility of epistemic success in its various forms (truth, fruitful mistakes, etc.). The book follows this up by providing a different approach to theory change in science using the notion of increasing degrees of epistemic verisimilitude in which empirical and pragmatic successes go hand in hand with different kinds of error. As a consequence, it proposes a distinctive epistemological stance towards the history of science, namely, that of an epistemological agnosticism cum rational epistemic hope. This new model of theory change, and its application to several moments in the history of science, provides the groundwork for criticizing the main arguments in favor of realism, anti-realism, and semi-realism. The account that is put forward avoids the main flaws of these three contenders but collects many of their virtues. This new approach and the laid groundwork make the book a valuable asset for researchers in epistemology and philosophy of science, including professional philosophers and post-graduate students.

ISBN: 9783032090225

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-032-09022-5doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

554789
Knowledge, Theory of.

LC Class. No.: BD161

Dewey Class. No.: 121

Knowledge in the world = epistemic vulnerability, verisimilitude, and truth /
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