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Game theory /

Tirole, Jean.

Game theory /

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Game theory // Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole.
Author:	Fudenberg, Drew.
other author:	Tirole, Jean.
Published:	Cambridge, Mass. :MIT Press, : 1991.,
Description:	xxiii, 579 p. :ill. ; : 27 cm.;
Subject:	Game theory. -
ISBN:	0262061414 (hbk.) :

Game theory /
Fudenberg, Drew.

Game theory /Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole. - Cambridge, Mass. :MIT Press,1991. - xxiii, 579 p. :ill. ;27 cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index (p. 573-579).

Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium --I.

ISBN: 0262061414 (hbk.) :NT2855

LCCN: 91002301

Nat. Bib. No.: GB9166506bnbSubjects--Topical Terms:

556918
Game theory.

LC Class. No.: HB144 / .F83 1991

Dewey Class. No.: 658.4/0353

Game theory /
LDR:01831cam a2200241 a 4500 001 788841
003 OCoLC
005 20140924054951.0
008 141013s1991 maua 001 0 eng
010 $a 91002301
015 $2 bnb $a GB9166506
015 $2 bnb $a GB9186229
020 $a 0262061414 (hbk.) : $c NT2855
020 $a 9780262061414 (hbk.)
035 $a (OCoLC)23180038 $z (OCoLC)26264539
035 $a ocm23180038
040 $a DLC $b eng $c DLC $d UKM $d UBA $d MUQ $d BAKER $d NLGGC $d BTCTA $d YDXCP $d DEBBG $d BDX $d GBVCP $d OCLCO $d DEBSZ $d FCC $d OCLCF $d WEX $d BEDGE $d OCLCQ $d NFU
050 0 0 $a HB144 $b .F83 1991
082 0 0 $2 20 $a 658.4/0353
100 1 $a Fudenberg, Drew. $3 943267
245 1 0 $a Game theory / $c Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole.
260 # $a Cambridge, Mass. : $c 1991. $b MIT Press,
300 $a xxiii, 579 p. : $b ill. ; $c 27 cm.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references and index (p. 573-579).
505 0 0 $g I. $g 1. $g 2. $g II. $g 3. $g 4. $g 5. $g III. $g 6. $g 7. Bayesian games and mechanism design -- $g IV. $g 8. $g 9. $g 10. $g V. $g 11. $g 12. $g 13. $g 14. $t Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium -- $t Dynamic games of incomplete information -- $t Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions -- $t Equilibrium refinements: perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection -- $t Games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium -- $t Reputation effects -- $t Repeated games -- $t Sequential bargaining under incomplete information -- $t Dynamic games of complete information -- $t Advanced topics -- $t Static games of incomplete information -- $t More equilibrium refinements: stability, forward induction, and iterated weak dominance -- $t Static games of complete information -- $t Advanced topics in strategic-form games -- $t Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium -- $t Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium -- $t Extensive-form games -- $t Common knowledge and games -- $t Index.
650 # 0 $a Game theory. $3 556918
650 # 0 $a Economics, Mathematical. $3 528442
700 1 # $a Tirole, Jean. $3 814274