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Auction theory /

Krishna, Vijay.

Auction theory /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Auction theory // Vijay Krishna.
作者:	Krishna, Vijay.
出版者:	Burlington, MA :Academic Press/Elsevier, : c2010.,
面頁冊數:	xi, 323 p. :ill. ; : 24 cm.;
標題:	Auctions - Mathematical models. -
ISBN:	9780123745071 (hbk.) :

Auction theory /
Krishna, Vijay.

Auction theory /Vijay Krishna. - 2nd ed. - Burlington, MA :Academic Press/Elsevier,c2010. - xi, 323 p. :ill. ;24 cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Introduction -- 2. Private ValueAuctions:A First Look -- 3. Revenue Equivalence Principle -- 4. Qualifications and Extensions -- 5. Mechanism Design -- 6. Auctions with Interdependent Values -- 7. Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle -- 8. Asymmetries and Other Complications -- 9. Efficiency and the English Auction -- 10. Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values -- 11. Bidding Rings -- 12. Introduction to Multiple-Object Auctions -- 13. Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values -- 14. Some Revenue Considerations -- 15. Sequential Sales -- 16. Nonidentical Objects -- 17. Packages and Positions -- 18. Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values -- A. Continuous Distributions -- B. Stochastic Orders -- C. Order Statistics -- D. Affiliated Random Variables -- E. Some Linear Algebra -- F. Games of Incomplete Information -- G. Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions.

ISBN: 9780123745071 (hbk.) :NT2493

LCCN: 2009027320Subjects--Topical Terms:

576947
Auctions
--Mathematical models.

LC Class. No.: HF5476 / .K75 2010

Dewey Class. No.: 381/.1701

Auction theory /
LDR:01579cam a2200229 a 4500 001 788842
003 OCoLC
005 20140924055004.0
008 141013s2010 maua 001 0 eng
010 $a 2009027320
020 $a 9780123745071 (hbk.) : $c NT2493
020 $a 0123745071 (hbk.)
035 $a (OCoLC)326688263
035 $a ocn326688263
040 $a DLC $b eng $c DLC $d YDX $d BTCTA $d YDXCP $d CDX $d HEBIS $d JG0 $d OCLCF $d OCLCO $d NFU
050 0 0 $a HF5476 $b .K75 2010
082 0 0 $2 22 $a 381/.1701
100 1 $a Krishna, Vijay. $3 657929
245 1 0 $a Auction theory / $c Vijay Krishna.
250 $a 2nd ed.
260 # $a Burlington, MA : $c c2010. $b Academic Press/Elsevier,
300 $a xi, 323 p. : $b ill. ; $c 24 cm.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references and index.
505 0 # $a 1. Introduction -- 2. Private ValueAuctions:A First Look -- 3. Revenue Equivalence Principle -- 4. Qualifications and Extensions -- 5. Mechanism Design -- 6. Auctions with Interdependent Values -- 7. Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle -- 8. Asymmetries and Other Complications -- 9. Efficiency and the English Auction -- 10. Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values -- 11. Bidding Rings -- 12. Introduction to Multiple-Object Auctions -- 13. Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values -- 14. Some Revenue Considerations -- 15. Sequential Sales -- 16. Nonidentical Objects -- 17. Packages and Positions -- 18. Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values -- A. Continuous Distributions -- B. Stochastic Orders -- C. Order Statistics -- D. Affiliated Random Variables -- E. Some Linear Algebra -- F. Games of Incomplete Information -- G. Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions.
650 # 0 $a Auctions $x Mathematical models. $3 576947
650 # 0 $a Game theory. $3 556918
650 # 0 $a Auction theory. $3 984783