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Praise and blame = moral realism and its applications /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Praise and blame/ Daniel N. Robinson.
其他題名:	moral realism and its applications /
作者:	Robinson, Daniel N.,
出版者:	Princeton, N.J. :Princeton University Press, : ©2002.,
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (xi, 225 p.).
標題:	Moral realism. -
電子資源:	http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctt7s3sm
ISBN:	9781400825318 (electronic bk.)

Praise and blame = moral realism and its applications /
Robinson, Daniel N.,1937-

Praise and blamemoral realism and its applications /[electronic resource] :Daniel N. Robinson. - Princeton, N.J. :Princeton University Press,©2002. - 1 online resource (xi, 225 p.). - New forum books. - New forum books..

Includes bibliographical references (p. 205-219) and index.

Defining the subject -- Constitutive luck: on being determined -- Moral luck, morality, and the fates -- Ignorance, unconsciousness, and responsibility -- Punishment and forgiveness.

How should a prize be awarded after a horse race? Should it go to the best rider, the best person, or the one who finishes first? To what extent are bystanders blameworthy when they do nothing to prevent harm? Are there any objective standards of moral responsibility with which to address such perennial questions? In this fluidly written and lively book, Daniel Robinson takes on the prodigious task of setting forth the contours of praise and blame. He does so by mounting an important and provocative new defense of a radical theory of moral realism and offering a critical appraisal of prevailing alternatives such as determinism and behaviorism and of their conceptual shortcomings. The version of moral realism that arises from Robinson's penetrating inquiry--an inquiry steeped in Aristotelian ethics but deeply informed by modern scientific knowledge of human cognition--is independent of cognition and emotion. At the same time, Robinson carefully explores how such human attributes succeed or fail in comprehending real moral properties. Through brilliant analyses of constitutional and moral luck, of biosocial and genetic versions of psychological determinism, and of relativistic-anthropological accounts of variations in moral precepts, he concludes that none of these conceptions accounts either for the nature of moral properties or the basis upon which they could be known. Ultimately, the theory that Robinson develops preserves moral properties even while acknowledging the conditions that undermine the powers of human will.

ISBN: 9781400825318 (electronic bk.)Subjects--Topical Terms:

576930
Moral realism.

LC Class. No.: BJ1500.M67 / R63 2009

Dewey Class. No.: 170

Praise and blame = moral realism and its applications /
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505 0 $a Defining the subject -- Constitutive luck: on being determined -- Moral luck, morality, and the fates -- Ignorance, unconsciousness, and responsibility -- Punishment and forgiveness.
520 $a How should a prize be awarded after a horse race? Should it go to the best rider, the best person, or the one who finishes first? To what extent are bystanders blameworthy when they do nothing to prevent harm? Are there any objective standards of moral responsibility with which to address such perennial questions? In this fluidly written and lively book, Daniel Robinson takes on the prodigious task of setting forth the contours of praise and blame. He does so by mounting an important and provocative new defense of a radical theory of moral realism and offering a critical appraisal of prevailing alternatives such as determinism and behaviorism and of their conceptual shortcomings. The version of moral realism that arises from Robinson's penetrating inquiry--an inquiry steeped in Aristotelian ethics but deeply informed by modern scientific knowledge of human cognition--is independent of cognition and emotion. At the same time, Robinson carefully explores how such human attributes succeed or fail in comprehending real moral properties. Through brilliant analyses of constitutional and moral luck, of biosocial and genetic versions of psychological determinism, and of relativistic-anthropological accounts of variations in moral precepts, he concludes that none of these conceptions accounts either for the nature of moral properties or the basis upon which they could be known. Ultimately, the theory that Robinson develops preserves moral properties even while acknowledging the conditions that undermine the powers of human will.
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