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Risk Sharing, Risk Spreading and Efficient Regulation

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Risk Sharing, Risk Spreading and Efficient Regulation/ by T.V.S. Ramamohan Rao.
Author:	Rao, T.V.S. Ramamohan.
Published:	New Delhi :Springer India : : 2016.,
Description:	xvii, 293 p. :ill., digital ; : 24 cm.;
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
Subject:	Risk - Mathematical models. -
Online resource:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2562-1
ISBN:	9788132225621

Risk Sharing, Risk Spreading and Efficient Regulation
Rao, T.V.S. Ramamohan.

Risk Sharing, Risk Spreading and Efficient Regulation[electronic resource] /by T.V.S. Ramamohan Rao. - New Delhi :Springer India :2016. - xvii, 293 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.

1. Introduction -- 2. Conferences and Publications -- 3. Knowledge Intensity and Risk sharing -- 4. Information Asymmetry -- 5. Technology Transfer -- 6. Equity Participation -- 7. Cost Sharing -- 8. Warranties and Risk Sharing -- 9. Accident and Health Insurance -- 10. Securitization and Volatility -- 11. Foreign Institutional Investors and Regulatory Diligence -- 12. Financial Crisis and Regulatory Policy -- 13. Estimating the Parameters -- 14. Conclusion.

The book provides an integrated approach to risk sharing, risk spreading and efficient regulation through principal agent models. It emphasizes the role of information asymmetry and risk sharing in contracts as an alternative to transaction cost considerations. It examines how contracting, as an institutional mechanism to conduct transactions, spreads risks while attempting consolidation. It further highlights the shifting emphasis in contracts from Coasian transaction cost saving to risk sharing and shows how it creates difficulties associated with risk spreading, and emphasizes the need for efficient regulation of contracts at various levels. Each of the chapters is structured using a principal agent model, and all chapters incorporate adverse selection (and exogenous randomness) as a result of information asymmetry, as well as moral hazard (and endogenous randomness) due to the self-interest-seeking behavior on the part of the participants.

ISBN: 9788132225621

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-81-322-2562-1doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

720235
Risk
--Mathematical models.

LC Class. No.: HB615

Dewey Class. No.: 338.5

Risk Sharing, Risk Spreading and Efficient Regulation
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245 1 0 $a Risk Sharing, Risk Spreading and Efficient Regulation $h [electronic resource] / $c by T.V.S. Ramamohan Rao.
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300 $a xvii, 293 p. : $b ill., digital ; $c 24 cm.
505 0 $a 1. Introduction -- 2. Conferences and Publications -- 3. Knowledge Intensity and Risk sharing -- 4. Information Asymmetry -- 5. Technology Transfer -- 6. Equity Participation -- 7. Cost Sharing -- 8. Warranties and Risk Sharing -- 9. Accident and Health Insurance -- 10. Securitization and Volatility -- 11. Foreign Institutional Investors and Regulatory Diligence -- 12. Financial Crisis and Regulatory Policy -- 13. Estimating the Parameters -- 14. Conclusion.
520 $a The book provides an integrated approach to risk sharing, risk spreading and efficient regulation through principal agent models. It emphasizes the role of information asymmetry and risk sharing in contracts as an alternative to transaction cost considerations. It examines how contracting, as an institutional mechanism to conduct transactions, spreads risks while attempting consolidation. It further highlights the shifting emphasis in contracts from Coasian transaction cost saving to risk sharing and shows how it creates difficulties associated with risk spreading, and emphasizes the need for efficient regulation of contracts at various levels. Each of the chapters is structured using a principal agent model, and all chapters incorporate adverse selection (and exogenous randomness) as a result of information asymmetry, as well as moral hazard (and endogenous randomness) due to the self-interest-seeking behavior on the part of the participants.
650 0 $a Risk $x Mathematical models. $3 720235
650 0 $a Risk management. $3 559158
650 0 $a Macroeconomics. $3 554837
650 1 4 $a Economics. $3 555568
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650 2 4 $a Microeconomics. $3 565210
650 2 4 $a R & D/Technology Policy. $3 669186
650 2 4 $a Finance, general. $3 1069041
650 2 4 $a Industrial Organization. $3 669248
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