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Verifiable privacy protection for vehicular communication systems

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Verifiable privacy protection for vehicular communication systems/ by David Forster.
作者:	Forster, David.
出版者:	Wiesbaden :Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden : : 2017.,
面頁冊數:	xv, 150 p. :ill. (some col.), digital ; : 24 cm.;
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Vehicular ad hoc networks (Computer networks) - Security measures. -
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-18550-3
ISBN:	9783658185503

Verifiable privacy protection for vehicular communication systems
Forster, David.

Verifiable privacy protection for vehicular communication systems[electronic resource] /by David Forster. - Wiesbaden :Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden :2017. - xv, 150 p. :ill. (some col.), digital ;24 cm.

A Large-scale Evaluation of Pseudonym Change Strategies -- A Pseudonym System with Strong Privacy Guarantees -- An Application for Privacy-preserving Analysis of Traffic Flows.

David Forster examines privacy protection for vehicular communication under the assumption of an attacker that is able to compromise back-end systems - motivated by the large number of recent security incidents and revelations about mass surveillance. The author aims for verifiable privacy protection enforced through cryptographic and technical means, which safeguards user data even if back-end systems are not fully trusted. Forster applies advanced cryptographic concepts, such as anonymous credentials, and introduces a novel decentralized secret sharing algorithm to fulfill complex and seemingly contradicting requirements in several vehicle-to-x application scenarios. Many of the concepts and results can also be applied to other flavors of internet of things systems. Contents A Large-scale Evaluation of Pseudonym Change Strategies A Pseudonym System with Strong Privacy Guarantees An Application for Privacy-preserving Analysis of Traffic Flows Target Groups Researchers and students in the field of vehicular ad-hoc networks, mobile ad-hoc networks, privacy, security, and distributed systems Practitioners in the field of vehicle-to-x communication, vehicle telematics, internet of things, privacy, and security About the Author David Forster completed his dissertation at Ulm University while working in the Corporate Research department of a leading German automotive supplier. He has worked as a consultant for IT security for several years and holds a degree in Computer Science from the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology.

ISBN: 9783658185503

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-658-18550-3doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

1078819
Vehicular ad hoc networks (Computer networks)
--Security measures.

LC Class. No.: TE228.37

Dewey Class. No.: 388.3124

Verifiable privacy protection for vehicular communication systems
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