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Political Connections in the Municipal Bond Market : = Is There a Pay-to-Stay.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Political Connections in the Municipal Bond Market :/
其他題名:	Is There a Pay-to-Stay.
作者:	Liu, Yu.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (63 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-01A(E).
標題:	Finance. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355144420

Political Connections in the Municipal Bond Market : = Is There a Pay-to-Stay.
Liu, Yu.

Political Connections in the Municipal Bond Market :Is There a Pay-to-Stay. - 1 online resource (63 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)

Includes bibliographical references

This paper investigates the impact of investment banks' political contributions on their underwriting business with local government officials. Using an original data set on municipal underwriting banks political contributions from 1994 to 2013, I find that political contributions are strongly associated with the likelihood that a contributing bank is hired, the bank's market share, and the bond issuance cost. Specifically, contributing underwriters receive 19.6% more business than non-contributing banks. Bonds underwritten by contributing banks incur 4% higher fees compared with their non-contributing peers. A contribution of $1,000 is associated with $1,270 higher total compensation for a contributing underwriter. These results continue to hold when controlling for underwriters characteristics and local economic factors. The evidence suggests that political connections still play a valuable role in the municipal bond market after the adoption of Rule G-37.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355144420Subjects--Topical Terms:

559073
Finance.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Political Connections in the Municipal Bond Market : = Is There a Pay-to-Stay.
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500 $a Adviser: Zhi Wang.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.) $c University of Oregon $d 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a This paper investigates the impact of investment banks' political contributions on their underwriting business with local government officials. Using an original data set on municipal underwriting banks political contributions from 1994 to 2013, I find that political contributions are strongly associated with the likelihood that a contributing bank is hired, the bank's market share, and the bond issuance cost. Specifically, contributing underwriters receive 19.6% more business than non-contributing banks. Bonds underwritten by contributing banks incur 4% higher fees compared with their non-contributing peers. A contribution of $1,000 is associated with $1,270 higher total compensation for a contributing underwriter. These results continue to hold when controlling for underwriters characteristics and local economic factors. The evidence suggests that political connections still play a valuable role in the municipal bond market after the adoption of Rule G-37.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Finance. $3 559073
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
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