國立虎尾科技大學 |

Essays in Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions./
作者:	Hernandez, Juan M.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (187 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-01A(E).
標題:	Economics. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355129793

Essays in Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions.
Hernandez, Juan M.

Essays in Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions. - 1 online resource (187 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)

Includes bibliographical references

How can governments design policies that alleviate the macroeconomic implications of financial frictions? This dissertation contributes to answer this question focusing on two aspects: international borrowing and crisis prevention at the country's level, and the impact of taxation and financial regulation on entrepreneurship at the agent's level. In the first chapter, debt crises arise from the incompleteness of sovereign debt markets: the government cannot credibly commit to repay or default in certain states of the world and this gives way to non-fundamental debt crises. In a strategic default environment, I show that international reserve holdings help to reduce the probability of these market-driven debt crises, advancing the theoretical literature that had struggled to explain why countries hold reserves while indebted. The results are consistent with previous empirical results that had shown countries with greater reserve holdings faced lower spreads in the sovereign debt markets, which is at odds with the previous theories. In the second chapter, a small open economy faces an aggregate borrowing constraint and the agents fail to internalize how their private borrowing decisions push the total debt towards the limit, making the current account adjustment more severe. We model the decentralized and planner's problem and find the optimal capital control policies, these are very effective to move the economy to the first-best scenario but also very hard to implement, given their state contingent nature. We then address the effectiveness of simpler policy rules, and find that they can bring welfare gains but had to be carefully designed. Finally, in the third chapter, the competition among investors for the most promising entrepreneurs, under adverse selection and limited liability, leads to an excessive entry into entrepreneurship activity and allocates resources to socially inefficient projects. We solve the optimal contracting problem and show that the inefficiency disappears if at least one of the next three is missing: competition in financial intermediation, adverse selection or limited liability. We also show that a small cost or fee per contract, like red-tape requirements, is enough to restore efficiency, making a case for financial regulation.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355129793Subjects--Topical Terms:

555568
Economics.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Essays in Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions.
LDR:03605ntm a2200373Ki 4500 001 910435
005 20180517123955.5
006 m o u
007 cr mn||||a|a||
008 190606s2017 xx obm 000 0 eng d
020 $a 9780355129793
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10274156
035 $a (MiAaPQ)upenngdas:12764
035 $a AAI10274156
040 $a MiAaPQ $b eng $c MiAaPQ
099 $a TUL $f hyy $c available through World Wide Web
100 1 $a Hernandez, Juan M. $3 1181725
245 1 0 $a Essays in Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions.
264 0 $c 2017
300 $a 1 online resource (187 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Enrique G. Mendoza.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.) $c University of Pennsylvania $d 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a How can governments design policies that alleviate the macroeconomic implications of financial frictions? This dissertation contributes to answer this question focusing on two aspects: international borrowing and crisis prevention at the country's level, and the impact of taxation and financial regulation on entrepreneurship at the agent's level. In the first chapter, debt crises arise from the incompleteness of sovereign debt markets: the government cannot credibly commit to repay or default in certain states of the world and this gives way to non-fundamental debt crises. In a strategic default environment, I show that international reserve holdings help to reduce the probability of these market-driven debt crises, advancing the theoretical literature that had struggled to explain why countries hold reserves while indebted. The results are consistent with previous empirical results that had shown countries with greater reserve holdings faced lower spreads in the sovereign debt markets, which is at odds with the previous theories. In the second chapter, a small open economy faces an aggregate borrowing constraint and the agents fail to internalize how their private borrowing decisions push the total debt towards the limit, making the current account adjustment more severe. We model the decentralized and planner's problem and find the optimal capital control policies, these are very effective to move the economy to the first-best scenario but also very hard to implement, given their state contingent nature. We then address the effectiveness of simpler policy rules, and find that they can bring welfare gains but had to be carefully designed. Finally, in the third chapter, the competition among investors for the most promising entrepreneurs, under adverse selection and limited liability, leads to an excessive entry into entrepreneurship activity and allocates resources to socially inefficient projects. We solve the optimal contracting problem and show that the inefficiency disappears if at least one of the next three is missing: competition in financial intermediation, adverse selection or limited liability. We also show that a small cost or fee per contract, like red-tape requirements, is enough to restore efficiency, making a case for financial regulation.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Economics. $3 555568
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 809881
650 4 $a Finance. $3 559073
650 4 $a International relations. $3 554886
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0508
690 $a 0601
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a University of Pennsylvania. $b Economics. $3 1179499
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 79-01A(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10274156 $z click for full text (PQDT)