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Three Essays on Government and Rebel Interactions.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Three Essays on Government and Rebel Interactions./
Author:	Crisman-Cox, Casey.
Description:	1 online resource (162 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-05(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International78-05A(E).
Subject:	Political science. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9781369291643

Three Essays on Government and Rebel Interactions.
Crisman-Cox, Casey.

Three Essays on Government and Rebel Interactions. - 1 online resource (162 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-05(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)

Includes bibliographical references

In the first essay of my dissertation, I derive a strategic statistical duration model from a formal model of bargaining and reputation and fit the model to civil war duration data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. I find that, on average, governments are more likely than rebels to be an intransigent type that refuses to negotiate. Rebel beliefs about the government's willingness to negotiate strongly influence both conflict duration and outcomes in non-obvious and sometimes non-monotonic ways. The results also provide new support for the contention that the reason separatist conflicts are longer is because of government stubbornness. Additionally, I uncover evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between state power and civil war duration which can be attributed to how the variable influences rebel (but not government) wartime demands. These non-monotonicities emerge without being pre-specified in the functional form.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9781369291643Subjects--Topical Terms:

558774
Political science.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Three Essays on Government and Rebel Interactions.
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100 1 $a Crisman-Cox, Casey. $3 1183601
245 1 0 $a Three Essays on Government and Rebel Interactions.
264 0 $c 2016
300 $a 1 online resource (162 pages)
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-05(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: H. E. Goemans.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.) $c University of Rochester $d 2016.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a In the first essay of my dissertation, I derive a strategic statistical duration model from a formal model of bargaining and reputation and fit the model to civil war duration data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. I find that, on average, governments are more likely than rebels to be an intransigent type that refuses to negotiate. Rebel beliefs about the government's willingness to negotiate strongly influence both conflict duration and outcomes in non-obvious and sometimes non-monotonic ways. The results also provide new support for the contention that the reason separatist conflicts are longer is because of government stubbornness. Additionally, I uncover evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between state power and civil war duration which can be attributed to how the variable influences rebel (but not government) wartime demands. These non-monotonicities emerge without being pre-specified in the functional form.
520 $a In the second essay, I continue my focus on internal conflicts by examining on domestic terrorism. In particular, I consider how groups adjust their behavior depending on the party that controls the government. This contributes to research on how domestic political institutions affect terrorism, which has expanded greatly in recent years. Much of this work focuses on relatively fixed institutions that don't vary over time. In contrast, I examine how the chief executive's political party affects domestic terrorism within democracies. I argue that domestic terrorist groups prefer attacking when right-wing parties hold office. I find evidence for this claim, along with results indicating that left-wing executives are more likely to cut a deal with these groups. These results suggest that domestic terrorist groups use attacks during right-wing governance to build their reputation, and reduce violence during left-wing governance to appear moderate and get a deal.
520 $a In the final essay, I consider this signaling mechanism in greater detail. Specifically, I want to know: how effective of a signal is terrorism? I address this question by fitting a statistical signaling model to data from the Israel-Palestine conflict. In particular, I find that while the size of the signal is generally small, it increases when Likud leaders are in power. Additionally, the size of the signal is largest during the so-called Oslo Lull. I also consider greed versus grievance motivations for Palestinian violence, and I find evidence for different motivations under different leaders.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Political science. $3 558774
650 4 $a International relations. $3 554886
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0615
690 $a 0601
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a University of Rochester. $b Arts and Sciences. $3 1183602
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 78-05A(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10179049 $z click for full text (PQDT)