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Essays on the Political Economy of Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Elections.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on the Political Economy of Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Elections./
作者:	Di Lonardo, Livio.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (178 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International78-12A(E).
標題:	Political science. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355128611

Essays on the Political Economy of Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Elections.
Di Lonardo, Livio.

Essays on the Political Economy of Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Elections. - 1 online resource (178 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)

Includes bibliographical references

How do target countries respond to terrorism? How do their institutions and values shape their counterterrorism strategies and are in turn affected by terrorist violence? In this dissertation I present three game-theoretic models that detail the strategic interaction between elected representatives tasked to prevent terrorism; citizens selecting officials who would protect their security while also defending their liberties; and of terrorist groups, who engage in violent activities in pursuit of their political goals.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355128611Subjects--Topical Terms:

558774
Political science.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Essays on the Political Economy of Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Elections.
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245 1 0 $a Essays on the Political Economy of Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Elections.
264 0 $c 2017
300 $a 1 online resource (178 pages)
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Alastair Smith.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.) $c New York University $d 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a How do target countries respond to terrorism? How do their institutions and values shape their counterterrorism strategies and are in turn affected by terrorist violence? In this dissertation I present three game-theoretic models that detail the strategic interaction between elected representatives tasked to prevent terrorism; citizens selecting officials who would protect their security while also defending their liberties; and of terrorist groups, who engage in violent activities in pursuit of their political goals.
520 $a In the first chapter, I focus on the accountability relationship between elected representative and citizens in the shadow of terrorism. In particular, I analyze how terrorist threats and attacks affect the policy-making decisions of reelection seeking-politicians and the outcomes of the electoral competition between parties with different reputations in their approach to fighting terrorism. I show how reputational concerns lead incumbents to enact policies that deviate from the counterterrorism strategy that balances optimally the concern for security and the protection of liberties. Left-wing incumbents, who are seen as potentially too soft on terrorism, respond to terror threats by curtailing civil liberties more aggressively than their right-wing counterparts, who usually have a reputation for prioritizing security over liberties even in safe times. As a result of these opposite reputations, successful terrorist attacks and/or a perception of a severe future terror threat improve right-wing incumbents' electoral prospects, while they worsen the reelection chances of left-wing incumbents.
520 $a In the other two chapters, I focus on the target countries' ability to deter violent groups from engaging in terrorist activities. More specifically, in the second chapter, we assess whether in the presence of uncertainty about the non-state group's ultimate goals the threat of military intervention can induce non-state groups not to conduct a terrorist campaign against the target country. We show that when target countries face groups that are known to be internally cohesive, the threat of a military intervention perfectly achieves deterrence-by-punishment and ensures security from terrorism. However, when target countries face terrorist groups that are potentially factionalized, the threat of military intervention from target countries is ineffective at deterring terrorist activities and can even have the effect of increasing the overall level of terrorism.
520 $a In the third chapter, I question whether the new counterterrorism approach focused on deterrence is effective at fighting terrorism long-term. I analyze a game where more aggressive counterterrorism measures improve both terrorism prevention and the government's ability to collect intelligence from operatives captured while in action. However, I show how the strategic interaction between the target government and the terrorist group generates a trade-off between minimizing costs from terrorist attacks and gathering intelligence through the capture of terrorist operatives. As the benefit from capturing operatives increases, the optimal counterterrorism strategy is to try and deter terrorist activities less, so as to induce the terrorist group to attempt larger attacks that are potentially more costly for the government, but that increase the exposure of operatives to security measures and are thus more easily foiled.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Political science. $3 558774
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0615
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a New York University. $b Politics. $3 1183627
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 78-12A(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10261664 $z click for full text (PQDT)