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Counterfactuals Without Causation, Probabilistic Counterfactuals and the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Counterfactuals Without Causation, Probabilistic Counterfactuals and the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation./
作者:	Loewenstein, Yael.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (88 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355227505

Counterfactuals Without Causation, Probabilistic Counterfactuals and the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation.
Loewenstein, Yael.

Counterfactuals Without Causation, Probabilistic Counterfactuals and the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. - 1 online resource (88 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Arizona, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

It is near-consensus among those currently working on the semantics of counterfactuals that the correct treatment of counterfactuals (whatever it is) must invoke causal independence in order to rule a particular set of seemingly true counterfactuals -- including a famous one called Morgenbesser's Coin (MC) -- true. But if we must analyze counterfactuals in terms of causation, this rules out giving a reductive account of causation in terms of counterfactuals, and is, as such, a serious blow to the Humean hope of reducing causation to counterfactual dependence.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355227505Subjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Counterfactuals Without Causation, Probabilistic Counterfactuals and the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation.
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245 1 0 $a Counterfactuals Without Causation, Probabilistic Counterfactuals and the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation.
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300 $a 1 online resource (88 pages)
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Terry Horgan.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Arizona, 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a It is near-consensus among those currently working on the semantics of counterfactuals that the correct treatment of counterfactuals (whatever it is) must invoke causal independence in order to rule a particular set of seemingly true counterfactuals -- including a famous one called Morgenbesser's Coin (MC) -- true. But if we must analyze counterfactuals in terms of causation, this rules out giving a reductive account of causation in terms of counterfactuals, and is, as such, a serious blow to the Humean hope of reducing causation to counterfactual dependence.
520 $a This dissertation is composed of three self-standing articles. In the first article I argue that counterfactuals like MC are false contrary to appearances; as is the thesis that the correct semantics of counterfactuals must appeal to causal independence.
520 $a In the second article I argue that there are important, widely-held assumptions about difference-making and its relationship to causation which are false, and which may underlie some of the remaining, most threatening objections to the counterfactual analysis of causation.
520 $a In the final article I discuss the puzzle of reverse Sobel sequences -- an alleged problem for the classic Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals. I argue that none of the extant approaches to the problem are right, and defend a novel solution to the puzzle. If I am correct, reverse Sobel sequences do not threaten the classic analysis. They do, however, give additional evidence for the thesis, forcefully defended by Alan Hajek, that most non-probabilistic 'would'-counterfactuals are false. This motivates placing a stronger emphasis on trying to understand probabilistic counterfactuals first and foremost.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 559771
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
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710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a The University of Arizona. $b Philosophy. $3 1184737
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