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Three Essays in Information and Its ...

ProQuest Information and Learning Co.

Three Essays in Information and Its Acquisition.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Three Essays in Information and Its Acquisition./
作者:	Cavounidis, Constantine S.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (126 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01(E), Section: A.
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355167399

Three Essays in Information and Its Acquisition.
Cavounidis, Constantine S.

Three Essays in Information and Its Acquisition. - 1 online resource (126 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

This thesis consists of three essays in economic theory, two on search models with information acquisition and one on repeated games when precise information about discount factors is unavailable.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355167399Subjects--Topical Terms:

809881
Economic theory.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Three Essays in Information and Its Acquisition.
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100 1 $a Cavounidis, Constantine S. $3 1185362
245 1 0 $a Three Essays in Information and Its Acquisition.
264 0 $c 2017
300 $a 1 online resource (126 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Kevin Lang.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University, 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a This thesis consists of three essays in economic theory, two on search models with information acquisition and one on repeated games when precise information about discount factors is unavailable.
520 $a In the first essay, I develop a model in which optimal costly information acquisition by individual firms causes adverse selection in the market as a whole. Each firm's information acquisition policy determines which customers it serves, which in turn affects the distribution of remaining customers and hence other firms' incentives. I show that when information acquisition is 'smooth', the adverse selection externality due to each firm is dampened, and in equilibrium all firms make positive profits. By contrast, with lumpy information acquisition, only a limited number of firms are profitable. I establish that my results apply to a broad class of continuous-time information acquisition processes.
520 $a The second essay explores information acquisition in labor markets. Noting that African-Americans face shorter employment durations than similar whites, we hypothesize that employers discriminate in acquiring ability-relevant information. We construct a model with a binary information generating process, 'monitoring', at the disposal of firms. Monitoring black but not white workers is self-sustaining. This 'bad' equilibrium is not merely a matter of coordination; rather, it is determined by history and not easily reversed. The model's additional predictions, lower lifetime incomes and longer unemployment durations for blacks, are both strongly empirically supported.
520 $a In the third essay, we investigate the possibility of repeated games equilibria that are robust to the discount factors. We prove a negative result which shows that a sizable part of the set of feasible individually rational payoffs can never be produced by such equilibria. We find the cutoff defining this region and interpret it as a limit on the ability to punish deviations when future rewards for randomization cannot be finely calibrated. Furthermore, we present a robust folk theorem to support payoffs in the complementary region with strategies that remain Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria at all greater discount factors.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 809881
650 4 $a Economics. $3 555568
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0501
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a Boston University. $b Economics GRS. $3 1185363
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10267455 $z click for full text (PQDT)

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