國立虎尾科技大學 |

Essays on Information Disclosure, Opportunistic Strategies, and Government Regulation.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on Information Disclosure, Opportunistic Strategies, and Government Regulation./
Author:	Zhu, Jialiang.
Description:	1 online resource (146 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01(E), Section: A.
Subject:	Economic theory. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355137262

Essays on Information Disclosure, Opportunistic Strategies, and Government Regulation.
Zhu, Jialiang.

Essays on Information Disclosure, Opportunistic Strategies, and Government Regulation. - 1 online resource (146 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The George Washington University, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

The opportunistic behaviors of agents facing mandatory regulation are well documented in industrial organization literature. This dissertation explores this behavior in restaurants which are subject to hygiene inspections in the United States.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355137262Subjects--Topical Terms:

809881
Economic theory.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Essays on Information Disclosure, Opportunistic Strategies, and Government Regulation.
LDR:03240ntm a2200349K 4500 001 912872
005 20180608130009.5
006 m o u
007 cr mn||||a|a||
008 190606s2017 xx obm 000 0 eng d
020 $a 9780355137262
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10602123
035 $a (MiAaPQ)gwu:13713
035 $a AAI10602123
040 $a MiAaPQ $b eng $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Zhu, Jialiang. $3 1185436
245 1 0 $a Essays on Information Disclosure, Opportunistic Strategies, and Government Regulation.
264 0 $c 2017
300 $a 1 online resource (146 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Wallace P. Wullin.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The George Washington University, 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a The opportunistic behaviors of agents facing mandatory regulation are well documented in industrial organization literature. This dissertation explores this behavior in restaurants which are subject to hygiene inspections in the United States.
520 $a The first chapter explores New York City's 2010 mandatory information disclosure policy of posting hygiene quality grade cards on restaurant windows. It finds that the dual inspection process (initial inspection and re-inspection) has been exploited by restaurants: after getting an A card in the re-inspection phase restaurants frequently revert back to their previous bad hygiene conditions. As a result, there is no significant overall hygiene improvement in NYC. Furthermore, the paper uses an ordered logit model to find that a reduction in asymmetric information for the consumer (the introduction of letter grades) narrows the difference between chain and non-chain restaurant hygiene scores.
520 $a The second chapter explores the role of repetition in government regulation. Using restaurant inspection data in King County, WA from 2006 to 2015, it finds if an unexpected inspector is acquainted to the restaurant he would report 10% more critical violations than a repeat inspector. Likewise, an unacquainted inspector would detect 28% more than a repeat inspector. Generally, the first arrival of a different and unexpected inspector would uncover more violations, with a higher (worse) hygiene score than a repeat inspector. The acquainted inspector effect demonstrates that objectivity in government regulation could be undermined by irrelevant factors.
520 $a The third chapter examines the 2014 policy modification to hygiene inspections in New York City. It uses and compares three models to determine the effect of this policy change. This paper finds that the violation fine reduction in this policy modification is not monetarily large enough to prevent more restaurants from behaving opportunistically. As a result, this modification does not fix the flaws in the letter grade policy.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 809881
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0511
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a The George Washington University. $b Economics. $3 1183508
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10602123 $z click for full text (PQDT)