國立虎尾科技大學 |

Essays in Politics and Policy.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Politics and Policy./
作者:	Evangelakis, Peter.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (138 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-02(E), Section: A.
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355234954

Essays in Politics and Policy.
Evangelakis, Peter.

Essays in Politics and Policy. - 1 online resource (138 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-02(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

1) Politicians and voters sometimes make decisions that conflict with their ideological position. I show that the presence of policy adjustment costs can generate this type of behavior in an electoral setting. Specifically, I study a two period model in which an incumbent sets policy, the median voter chooses between the incumbent and an opposite party challenger, and the winner of the election can change policy. A small change is costless but a larger change induces a strictly positive adjustment cost. If the politicians are highly polarized, then the incumbent can choose her preferred policy in both periods and guarantee her re-election, even if she is somewhat more extreme than the challenger. Otherwise, she has to decide between guaranteeing that the election winner chooses her preferred policy during period 2 and guaranteeing her re-election. If she is not highly office-motivated, then she accomplishes the former by choosing a policy that is slightly more extreme than her preferred policy. If she is highly office-motivated and political polarization is sufficiently low, then she accomplishes the latter by choosing the most moderate policy on the other side of the political spectrum. The median voter is best off in this case.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355234954Subjects--Topical Terms:

809881
Economic theory.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Essays in Politics and Policy.
LDR:04207ntm a2200337K 4500 001 912888
005 20180608130009.5
006 m o u
007 cr mn||||a|a||
008 190606s2017 xx obm 000 0 eng d
020 $a 9780355234954
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10616592
035 $a (MiAaPQ)uchicago:14029
035 $a AAI10616592
040 $a MiAaPQ $b eng $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Evangelakis, Peter. $3 1185460
245 1 0 $a Essays in Politics and Policy.
264 0 $c 2017
300 $a 1 online resource (138 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-02(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Richard Van Weelden.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a 1) Politicians and voters sometimes make decisions that conflict with their ideological position. I show that the presence of policy adjustment costs can generate this type of behavior in an electoral setting. Specifically, I study a two period model in which an incumbent sets policy, the median voter chooses between the incumbent and an opposite party challenger, and the winner of the election can change policy. A small change is costless but a larger change induces a strictly positive adjustment cost. If the politicians are highly polarized, then the incumbent can choose her preferred policy in both periods and guarantee her re-election, even if she is somewhat more extreme than the challenger. Otherwise, she has to decide between guaranteeing that the election winner chooses her preferred policy during period 2 and guaranteeing her re-election. If she is not highly office-motivated, then she accomplishes the former by choosing a policy that is slightly more extreme than her preferred policy. If she is highly office-motivated and political polarization is sufficiently low, then she accomplishes the latter by choosing the most moderate policy on the other side of the political spectrum. The median voter is best off in this case.
520 $a 2) I examine the socially optimal term length of an unelected policy-maker (e.g., a bureaucrat) when his current policy choice can influence the payoff from a future policy choice his office will make. In particular, I measure term length by the policy-maker's retention probability, i.e., the probability that he will remain in office to make that future policy choice instead of being replaced before it arises. There are two main classes of result. First, if the policy-maker and citizens are guaranteed to agree about the immediate value of the current policy but there is sufficient scope for disagreement about the value of the future policy, then the uniquely optimal retention probability is zero. Second, if the policy-maker and citizens can disagree about the value of both policies, then there are conditions under which the uniquely optimal retention probability is zero, but there are also conditions under which all retention probabilities (e.g., zero) are weakly optimal and conditions under which the uniquely optimal retention probability is one. The key determinant is whether a given citizen's continuation value from the passage of the current policy is greater than, equal to, or less than the continuation value of a policy-maker who is guaranteed to remain in power.
520 $a 3) Laws that constrain the size of local government budgets, often called tax and expenditure limits, exist in over half of U.S. states. I study the effects of one such statute passed in Florida in 2007 that required local governments to cut property tax levies. Specifically, I use a regression discontinuity approach to determine the impact of the statute on the size and composition of municipal government revenues. Using detailed budget data, I find evidence of substitution away from tax revenues and towards revenue from fees.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 809881
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0511
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a The University of Chicago. $b Economics. $3 1180755
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10616592 $z click for full text (PQDT)