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Automaticity and Control in Human Action.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Automaticity and Control in Human Action./
作者:	Bermudez-Rey, Juan Pablo.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (263 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-08(E), Section: A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9781339554334

Automaticity and Control in Human Action.
Bermudez-Rey, Juan Pablo.

Automaticity and Control in Human Action. - 1 online resource (263 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-08(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto (Canada), 2016.

Includes bibliographical references

Since a large portion of our behaviour is automatic, what kind of agency and control do we humans have, and what are its limits? I address the question both from a historical perspective (through Aristotle's philosophy) and a contemporary approach (engaging with recent empirical research).

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9781339554334Subjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Automaticity and Control in Human Action.
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300 $a 1 online resource (263 pages)
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-08(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Mark Kingwell.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto (Canada), 2016.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Since a large portion of our behaviour is automatic, what kind of agency and control do we humans have, and what are its limits? I address the question both from a historical perspective (through Aristotle's philosophy) and a contemporary approach (engaging with recent empirical research).
520 $a I begin with Aristotle's action theory, which has remarkable resonances with current issues. He claims our goals are determined by non-rational habituation, so the question arises how we can control our life's ends if they cannot be set rationally. I argue that for Aristotle we control our goals insofar as we carefully shape our habits. Care for habits belongs, not just to the individual (who cannot care for her habituation's first stages), but primarily to the political community. So individual autonomy depends on social care practices; and reason can establish goals not directly, but by carefully shaping habits.
520 $a I go on to argue that empirical evidence justifies a broadly similar account.
520 $a Intellectualists hold that all actions must be produced through reflection (i.e. a top-down coordination by reference to a goal); anti-intellectualists argue that some actions can be produced without reflection. Anti-intellectualists receive preliminary empirical support from evidence that there is a kind of normativity proper to automatic (i.e. reflection-independent) processes, which reveals the existence of automatic control. Is automatic control sufficient for the production of intentional actions? Anti-intellectualists have often pointed to skilful bodily action to argue that it is, but I contend that even skilled action requires top-down, reflective control, confirming recent intellectualist proposals.
520 $a So anti-intellectualism cannot find support in skilled-action phenomena; but it may find more promising evidence in decision-making studies. Framing effects in decision-making reveal that we control intention-formation processes automatically through background control: intuitive sense- making processes that are nonetheless susceptible to cognitive biases largely incorrigible by reflection. However, smart environmental design is able to protect intuitive control over decision-making. This supports a thesis called indirect intellectualism: like Aristotle, we should conceive of individual control over action as significantly dependent on reflectively shaping our practical environment.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 559771
650 4 $a Psychology. $3 555998
650 4 $a Cognitive psychology. $3 556029
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
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690 $a 0633
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a University of Toronto (Canada). $b Philosophy. $3 1186535
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10043980 $z click for full text (PQDT)