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Concepts in psychology : = Towards a better hybrid theory.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Concepts in psychology :/
Reminder of title:	Towards a better hybrid theory.
Author:	Gonnerman, Chad.
Description:	1 online resource (206 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-02(E), Section: A.
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9781303483349

Concepts in psychology : = Towards a better hybrid theory.
Gonnerman, Chad.

Concepts in psychology :Towards a better hybrid theory. - 1 online resource (206 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-02(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2013.

Includes bibliographical references

Philosophers, psychologists, and linguists have long been interested in concepts construed along the lines of bodies of knowledge or information. One traditional question asked is `What is their structural nature?' Standard theories answer, "Concepts are definitions or prototypes or some such single structure." I argue that there is reason to worry that these theories are mistaken in light of empirical work suggesting that the typical mind is populated by multiple types of structures across most conceptual categories. Such work encourages us to return to basics and ask, "What are concepts (in cognitive psychology)?" I argue that the leading proposal currently on offer is defaultism, the view that concepts are default bodies of knowledge stored in long-term memory. I then criticize this proposal primarily on the grounds that it is problematically inexact, leaving unclear the hierarchical level on which concepts exist. In its place, I offer an alternative, one that opens up the possibility that most concepts are hybrids, or informational complex composed of multiple bodies of knowledge coming from distinct structural kinds. I end by highlighting some of the troubles that these theories, and supporting empirical work, create for those philosophical naturalists and experimental philosophers who are interested in using intuitions to analyze concepts construed along the lines of informational bodies.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9781303483349Subjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Concepts in psychology : = Towards a better hybrid theory.
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245 1 0 $a Concepts in psychology : $b Towards a better hybrid theory.
264 0 $c 2013
300 $a 1 online resource (206 pages)
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-02(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: Jonathan M. Weinberg; Timothy O'Connor.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2013.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Philosophers, psychologists, and linguists have long been interested in concepts construed along the lines of bodies of knowledge or information. One traditional question asked is `What is their structural nature?' Standard theories answer, "Concepts are definitions or prototypes or some such single structure." I argue that there is reason to worry that these theories are mistaken in light of empirical work suggesting that the typical mind is populated by multiple types of structures across most conceptual categories. Such work encourages us to return to basics and ask, "What are concepts (in cognitive psychology)?" I argue that the leading proposal currently on offer is defaultism, the view that concepts are default bodies of knowledge stored in long-term memory. I then criticize this proposal primarily on the grounds that it is problematically inexact, leaving unclear the hierarchical level on which concepts exist. In its place, I offer an alternative, one that opens up the possibility that most concepts are hybrids, or informational complex composed of multiple bodies of knowledge coming from distinct structural kinds. I end by highlighting some of the troubles that these theories, and supporting empirical work, create for those philosophical naturalists and experimental philosophers who are interested in using intuitions to analyze concepts construed along the lines of informational bodies.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 559771
650 4 $a Epistemology. $3 671538
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
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710 2 $a Indiana University. $b Philosophy. $3 1186672
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