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Ethical Theory Meets Cognitive Science : = A Naturalized Aristotelian Alternative to Principles-Based Ethics.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Ethical Theory Meets Cognitive Science :/
其他題名:	A Naturalized Aristotelian Alternative to Principles-Based Ethics.
作者:	Suhler, Christopher Louis.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (223 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-07(E), Section: A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9781321577518

Ethical Theory Meets Cognitive Science : = A Naturalized Aristotelian Alternative to Principles-Based Ethics.
Suhler, Christopher Louis.

Ethical Theory Meets Cognitive Science :A Naturalized Aristotelian Alternative to Principles-Based Ethics. - 1 online resource (223 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-07(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2014.

Includes bibliographical references

Contemporary philosophical ethics, despite its myriad theoretical disputes, is in broad agreement about the proper form and methods of ethical theorizing. The standard paradigm in contemporary ethics comprises, roughly, the following three assumptions: (1) ethics is concerned with the evaluation of particular actions; (2) the job of ethical theory is to devise principles that provide (necessary and sufficient) criteria for an action's being right/wrong; (3) to be adequate, such principles must broadly align with our intuitive verdicts about the status of particular actions.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9781321577518Subjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Ethical Theory Meets Cognitive Science : = A Naturalized Aristotelian Alternative to Principles-Based Ethics.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-07(E), Section: A.
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502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2014.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Contemporary philosophical ethics, despite its myriad theoretical disputes, is in broad agreement about the proper form and methods of ethical theorizing. The standard paradigm in contemporary ethics comprises, roughly, the following three assumptions: (1) ethics is concerned with the evaluation of particular actions; (2) the job of ethical theory is to devise principles that provide (necessary and sufficient) criteria for an action's being right/wrong; (3) to be adequate, such principles must broadly align with our intuitive verdicts about the status of particular actions.
520 $a Appealing as this view is in principle, it fails badly in practice. Proposed ethical theories inevitably succumb to counterexamples---cases in which they yield verdicts that conflict with our intuitive judgments. I argue that the ubiquity of counterexamples, and with it entrenched theoretical disagreement, stems from a mismatch between the psychological assumptions of the standard paradigm and actual human psychology. Our natural concepts are not structured in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, instead having a prototype structure in which there is no core set of features common to all and only members of the concept/category. Given this, it is unsurprising that there are always substantial gaps between ethical theories' verdicts and our intuitive judgments.
520 $a Drawing on convergent historical considerations, I argue that philosophy should return to an Aristotelian conception of ethics, according to which ethics is not a set of abstract principles, but rather a practical science analogous to medicine. However, just as we are not limited when practicing medicine to an ancient understanding of the natural world, so too in ethics should the naturalistic basis of our theory be a modern one. I therefore suggest that the best way forward for ethics is a marriage between (1) an Aristotelian view of ethics as a practical science concerned with proper human functioning and the habits of thought/action that constitute it and (2) a modern scientific understanding of the world, drawn principally from the cognitive and biological sciences. This approach allows us to avoid both the difficulties with principles-based approaches, and the sometimes outdated factual and normative aspects of Aristotle's own theory.
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