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Hardware Trojans in Wireless Cryptographic ICs.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Hardware Trojans in Wireless Cryptographic ICs./
Author:	Liu, Yu.
Description:	1 online resource (118 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-03(E), Section: B.
Subject:	Electrical engineering. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355392555

Hardware Trojans in Wireless Cryptographic ICs.
Liu, Yu.

Hardware Trojans in Wireless Cryptographic ICs. - 1 online resource (118 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-03(E), Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Texas at Dallas, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

Over the last decade, the problem of hardware Trojans in manufactured integrated circuits (ICs) has been a topic of intense investigation by academic researchers and governmental entities. Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications introduced in a manufactured IC, which can be exploited by a knowledgeable adversary to cause incorrect results, steal sensitive data, or even incapacitate a chip. Given the sensitive nature of applications wherein hardware Trojan-infested ICs may be deployed, developing detection methodologies has become paramount. Indeed, traditional test methods fall short in revealing hardware Trojans, as they are geared towards identifying modeled defects and, therefore, cannot reveal unmodeled malicious inclusions.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355392555Subjects--Topical Terms:

596380
Electrical engineering.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Hardware Trojans in Wireless Cryptographic ICs.
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245 1 0 $a Hardware Trojans in Wireless Cryptographic ICs.
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300 $a 1 online resource (118 pages)
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-03(E), Section: B.
500 $a Adviser: Yiorgos Makris.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Texas at Dallas, 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Over the last decade, the problem of hardware Trojans in manufactured integrated circuits (ICs) has been a topic of intense investigation by academic researchers and governmental entities. Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications introduced in a manufactured IC, which can be exploited by a knowledgeable adversary to cause incorrect results, steal sensitive data, or even incapacitate a chip. Given the sensitive nature of applications wherein hardware Trojan-infested ICs may be deployed, developing detection methodologies has become paramount. Indeed, traditional test methods fall short in revealing hardware Trojans, as they are geared towards identifying modeled defects and, therefore, cannot reveal unmodeled malicious inclusions.
520 $a Various hardware Trojan detection methods have been proposed, most of them targeted digital circuits. As pointed out therein, the Analog/RF domain is an attractive attack target, since the wireless communication of these chips with the environment over public channels simplifies the process of staging an attack without obtaining physical access to the I/O of the chip. On the other hand, signals in an Analog/RF IC are continuous and highly-correlated to one another; hence, the likelihood of a modification disturbing these correlations is very high. Therefore, this dissertation outlines the problems and proposes three solutions to ensure trustworthiness of Analog/RF ICs: namely, i) Utilize statistical side channel fingerprinting to detect hardware Trojan in Analog/RF ICs. ii) Propose to use a combination of a trusted simulation model, measurements from process control monitors (PCMs), that are typically present either on die or on wafer kerf, and advanced statistical tail modeling techniques to detect hardware Trojan without relying on golden chips. iii) Introduce a concurrent hardware Trojan detection (CHTD) methodology for wireless cryptographic integrated circuits (ICs), based on continuous extraction of a side-channel fingerprint and evaluation by a trained on-chip neural classifier. All methods proposed in this dissertation have been verified with measurements from actual silicon chips.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Electrical engineering. $3 596380
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0544
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a The University of Texas at Dallas. $b Electrical Engineering. $3 1181534
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10675234 $z click for full text (PQDT)