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Prioritized Interests : = Why Congressional Committees Address Some Problems and Ignore Others.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Prioritized Interests :/
其他題名:	Why Congressional Committees Address Some Problems and Ignore Others.
作者:	Lorenz, Geoffrey.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (143 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-04(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-04A(E).
標題:	Political science. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355366051

Prioritized Interests : = Why Congressional Committees Address Some Problems and Ignore Others.
Lorenz, Geoffrey.

Prioritized Interests :Why Congressional Committees Address Some Problems and Ignore Others. - 1 online resource (143 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-04(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation examines why Congress addresses some problems while ignoring others. Key to this process are congressional committees, which organize much of Congress's day-to-day activity but whose role has been downplayed in recent scholarship on congressional lawmaking. I examine how committees come to address particular problems with legislation, across three substantive papers. First, I find that while committee leaders may be more constrained in their agenda-setting powers than in the past, they can still direct their committee's attention to issue areas that they prioritize personally. In the second and third parts of the dissertation, I examine how interest group lobbying influences chairs' agenda-setting decisions with respect to individual bills. In the second paper, I develop the concept of interest diversity as the relative degree of observable variety of social identities, political causes, or industries represented by set of organizations. Using new data on interest groups' positions on over 5000 bills introduced during the 109th to 113th Congresses, I develop and validate a measure for interest diversity among groups lobbying on a bill. I show that the net interest diversity on a bill, the difference in supporters' and opponents' interest diversities, varies in ways that are both consistent with general predictions about interest group activity as well as with well-understood patterns of legislative and interest group behavior. In the third paper, I examine how bills' net interest diversity impacts the legislative agendas of congressional committees. I argue that committee chairs' incentives to promote viable legislation induce them to favor bills garnering the support of a diverse array of causes and industries, who are in turn able to mobilize the sustained support and attention of many legislators. I find that bills with higher net interest diversity are more likely to be considered in committee. I then show how these associations vary across bill sponsors and party alignments between Congress and the White House. Taken together, these results suggest that interest group influence, and what makes interest groups influential, is moderated by legislative institutions and may be more benign than is commonly assumed.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355366051Subjects--Topical Terms:

558774
Political science.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Prioritized Interests : = Why Congressional Committees Address Some Problems and Ignore Others.
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520 $a This dissertation examines why Congress addresses some problems while ignoring others. Key to this process are congressional committees, which organize much of Congress's day-to-day activity but whose role has been downplayed in recent scholarship on congressional lawmaking. I examine how committees come to address particular problems with legislation, across three substantive papers. First, I find that while committee leaders may be more constrained in their agenda-setting powers than in the past, they can still direct their committee's attention to issue areas that they prioritize personally. In the second and third parts of the dissertation, I examine how interest group lobbying influences chairs' agenda-setting decisions with respect to individual bills. In the second paper, I develop the concept of interest diversity as the relative degree of observable variety of social identities, political causes, or industries represented by set of organizations. Using new data on interest groups' positions on over 5000 bills introduced during the 109th to 113th Congresses, I develop and validate a measure for interest diversity among groups lobbying on a bill. I show that the net interest diversity on a bill, the difference in supporters' and opponents' interest diversities, varies in ways that are both consistent with general predictions about interest group activity as well as with well-understood patterns of legislative and interest group behavior. In the third paper, I examine how bills' net interest diversity impacts the legislative agendas of congressional committees. I argue that committee chairs' incentives to promote viable legislation induce them to favor bills garnering the support of a diverse array of causes and industries, who are in turn able to mobilize the sustained support and attention of many legislators. I find that bills with higher net interest diversity are more likely to be considered in committee. I then show how these associations vary across bill sponsors and party alignments between Congress and the White House. Taken together, these results suggest that interest group influence, and what makes interest groups influential, is moderated by legislative institutions and may be more benign than is commonly assumed.
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