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CEO Risk-taking Incentives and Finan...

The University of Texas at San Antonio.

CEO Risk-taking Incentives and Financial Reporting.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	CEO Risk-taking Incentives and Financial Reporting./
Author:	McWilliams, Jerome Alexander.
Description:	1 online resource (111 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-09(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-09A(E).
Subject:	Accounting. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355959178

CEO Risk-taking Incentives and Financial Reporting.
McWilliams, Jerome Alexander.

CEO Risk-taking Incentives and Financial Reporting. - 1 online resource (111 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-09(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Texas at San Antonio, 2018.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation consists of two essays that analyze the role of CEO equity risk-taking incentives in financial reporting. The first essay examines the relationship between executive risk-taking incentives and four temporal properties of earnings, including: volatility, persistence, predictability, and accruals quality. The second essay analyzes executive equity risk-taking incentives as a moderator for the relationship between earnings manipulation and stock market-based transactions.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355959178Subjects--Topical Terms:

561166
Accounting.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

CEO Risk-taking Incentives and Financial Reporting.
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100 1 $a McWilliams, Jerome Alexander. $3 1190513
245 1 0 $a CEO Risk-taking Incentives and Financial Reporting.
264 0 $c 2018
300 $a 1 online resource (111 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-09(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: Jennifer Yin; Emeka Nwaeze.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Texas at San Antonio, 2018.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a This dissertation consists of two essays that analyze the role of CEO equity risk-taking incentives in financial reporting. The first essay examines the relationship between executive risk-taking incentives and four temporal properties of earnings, including: volatility, persistence, predictability, and accruals quality. The second essay analyzes executive equity risk-taking incentives as a moderator for the relationship between earnings manipulation and stock market-based transactions.
520 $a I measure CEO equity risk-taking incentives as the sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock volatility. The second essay explores accruals earnings management and real activities manipulation surrounding CEO option exercises and option grants. In both essays I deploy fixed-effect models, instrumental variables, and simultaneous equation models to control for possible endogeneity.
520 $a I find that CEO vega is positively associated with earnings volatility. Predicted values of vega, estimated using determinants of vega from prior research, appear to be positively associated with earnings predictability. However, actual values of vega that exceed the predicted values of vega appear to lead to decreases in earnings predictability. I find that vega is negatively associated with short-term earnings persistence, and this association is primarily driven by a decrease in the persistence of accruals. Finally, using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual quality metric, I find a negative relationship between CEO and accrual quality.
520 $a In the second essay, I find that CEO's with high levels of vega exercise fewer options during and following periods of high income increasing earnings management and engage in less downwards earnings management in periods preceding fixed-date option grants.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Accounting. $3 561166
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0272
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a The University of Texas at San Antonio. $b Accounting. $3 1181157
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 79-09A(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10815203 $z click for full text (PQDT)

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