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Theoretical Investigations of Partnership Turnover and of Money.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Theoretical Investigations of Partnership Turnover and of Money./
Author:	Fukai, Hiroki.
Description:	1 online resource (73 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International78-11A(E).
Subject:	Economics. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9781369991536

Theoretical Investigations of Partnership Turnover and of Money.
Fukai, Hiroki.

Theoretical Investigations of Partnership Turnover and of Money. - 1 online resource (73 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Pennsylvania State University, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter examines the turnover of multiperiod partnerships. The turnover of multiperiod partnerships such as marriages, labor contracts, and joint ventures varies over time and across countries. A model is set out in which thesedifferent observations arise as multiple equilibria. In a random pairwise matching model, players are heterogeneous in time preference and each pair plays a prisoners' dilemma game with random payoffs from mutual cooperation. Two steady states are constructed: in one, non-myopic players cooperate even when a match has low payoffs from mutual cooperation; in the other, they cooperate only when a match has high payoffss from it. Transition dynamics across the two steady states are studied. For a numerical example, it is shown that a transition in either direction is an equilibrium.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9781369991536Subjects--Topical Terms:

555568
Economics.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Theoretical Investigations of Partnership Turnover and of Money.
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100 1 $a Fukai, Hiroki. $3 1190985
245 1 0 $a Theoretical Investigations of Partnership Turnover and of Money.
264 0 $c 2017
300 $a 1 online resource (73 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Neil Wallace.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Pennsylvania State University, 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a This dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter examines the turnover of multiperiod partnerships. The turnover of multiperiod partnerships such as marriages, labor contracts, and joint ventures varies over time and across countries. A model is set out in which thesedifferent observations arise as multiple equilibria. In a random pairwise matching model, players are heterogeneous in time preference and each pair plays a prisoners' dilemma game with random payoffs from mutual cooperation. Two steady states are constructed: in one, non-myopic players cooperate even when a match has low payoffs from mutual cooperation; in the other, they cooperate only when a match has high payoffss from it. Transition dynamics across the two steady states are studied. For a numerical example, it is shown that a transition in either direction is an equilibrium.
520 $a The last three chapters are contributions to monetary economics. In the second chapter, written jointly with Yu Awaya, a counter-example to the notion that money is memory is provided---one that relies on incomplete information. For it, there exists an implementable allocation with money which is not implementable with memory. The result arises because money conveys only a limited amount of information about past actions which can be beneficial in settings with incomplete information.
520 $a In the third chapter, I examine a necessary condition for fiat money to be essential. Fiat money, an intrinsically useless object, is said to be essential if some good allocations are achieved with it but not without it. It is shown that imperfect monitoring is necessary for money to be essential in a large class of economic environments. This provides a guide for the construction of models in which monetary trade achieves good outcomes.
520 $a In the fourth chapter, written jointly with Yu Awaya, it is shown that a seemingly strong condition is not sufficient for money to be essential. Money is thought to be essential when it is difficult to monitor others' behavior. We provide a counterexample to the view. For it, it is shown that even if there is no monitoring, money is inessential---the first best allocation can be attained without money (or any other form of monitoring).
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Economics. $3 555568
650 4 $a Commerce-Business. $3 1179465
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0505
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a The Pennsylvania State University. $b College of the Liberal Arts. $3 1190986
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 78-11A(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10629050 $z click for full text (PQDT)