國立虎尾科技大學 |

Freedom, Feeling and Character : = The Unity of Reason and Sensibility in Kant's Practical Philosophy.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Freedom, Feeling and Character :/
其他題名:	The Unity of Reason and Sensibility in Kant's Practical Philosophy.
作者:	Berg, Anastasia Netta Artemyev.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (141 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International78-12A(E).
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355233636

Freedom, Feeling and Character : = The Unity of Reason and Sensibility in Kant's Practical Philosophy.
Berg, Anastasia Netta Artemyev.

Freedom, Feeling and Character :The Unity of Reason and Sensibility in Kant's Practical Philosophy. - 1 online resource (141 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

The dominant reception of Kant accords him the view that our capacity for feeling and our capacity for self-determination are essentially independent of one another: feelings, therefore, are essentially un-free. The negative aim of the dissertation is to argue against this standard interpretation; the positive aim is to offer an alternative.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355233636Subjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Freedom, Feeling and Character : = The Unity of Reason and Sensibility in Kant's Practical Philosophy.
LDR:03436ntm a2200337Ki 4500 001 917986
005 20181022132813.5
006 m o u
007 cr mn||||a|a||
008 190606s2017 xx obm 000 0 eng d
020 $a 9780355233636
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10274433
035 $a (MiAaPQ)uchicago:13786
035 $a AAI10274433
040 $a MiAaPQ $b eng $c MiAaPQ $d NTU
100 1 $a Berg, Anastasia Netta Artemyev. $3 1192197
245 1 0 $a Freedom, Feeling and Character : $b The Unity of Reason and Sensibility in Kant's Practical Philosophy.
264 0 $c 2017
300 $a 1 online resource (141 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Robert B. Pippin.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a The dominant reception of Kant accords him the view that our capacity for feeling and our capacity for self-determination are essentially independent of one another: feelings, therefore, are essentially un-free. The negative aim of the dissertation is to argue against this standard interpretation; the positive aim is to offer an alternative.
520 $a I demonstrate that the standard interpretation is not only alien to our ordinary ways of self-understanding but that it moreover threatens the internal coherence of the Kantian account itself. I develop an alternative by examining Kant's account of how reason motivates the agent: first, in the account of the feeling of moral respect, and, second, in the account of moral character. I argue that moral respect does not name one particular feeling among many but that implicit in Kant's account is the previously unrecognized idea that human feeling is a unique mode of self-consciousness---disclosing the subject to herself as rational and efficacious, i.e., as a moral agent. The distinctively human capacity for feeling emerges as the form of self-consciousness constitutive of practical agency, i.e., of freedom. This understanding of feeling allows us to reevaluate Kant's account of moral character. Drawing on an Aristotelian understanding of the logical structure of capacities and activities I argue that character is the activity of maintaining one's identity as a practical agent---an activity that consists in maintaining the agent's structure of motivation. I then attend to the apparent tension between Kant's rigorism---the claim that an agent is of either wholly good or wholly evil character---and his nuanced account of the grades of moral imperfection. In addition to good and bad character, I claim, we must find room for moral immaturity, or the partial acquisition of moral character. To do this we must recognize the acquisition of moral character as a form of rational accomplishment: the development and determination of our rational capacities for feeling. Thus, on this alternative interpretation of Kant's account, feeling and character do not oppose, but are rather the constitutive conditions of freedom.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 559771
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0422
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a The University of Chicago. $b Social Thought and Philosophy. $3 1192198
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 78-12A(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10274433 $z click for full text (PQDT)