語系:
繁體中文
English
說明(常見問題)
登入
回首頁
切換:
標籤
|
MARC模式
|
ISBD
Compensation Disclosures and the Wea...
~
Bloomfield, Matthew.
Compensation Disclosures and the Weaponization of Executive Pay : = Evidence from Revenue-based Performance Evaluation.
紀錄類型:
書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:
Compensation Disclosures and the Weaponization of Executive Pay :/
其他題名:
Evidence from Revenue-based Performance Evaluation.
作者:
Bloomfield, Matthew.
面頁冊數:
1 online resource (61 pages)
附註:
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-08(E), Section: A.
Contained By:
Dissertation Abstracts International79-08A(E).
標題:
Accounting. -
電子資源:
click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:
9780355804041
Compensation Disclosures and the Weaponization of Executive Pay : = Evidence from Revenue-based Performance Evaluation.
Bloomfield, Matthew.
Compensation Disclosures and the Weaponization of Executive Pay :
Evidence from Revenue-based Performance Evaluation. - 1 online resource (61 pages)
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-08(E), Section: A.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2018.
Includes bibliographical references
Analytical work on strategic delegation shows that Cournot competitors can boost their profitability by using revenue-based pay to commit to more aggressive behavior (Fershtman and Judd, 1987), but only if pay packages are credibly disclosed (Katz, 1991). However, no empirical evidence demonstrates that firms actually employ such strategies. I exploit a regulatory shock that forced public firms to provide detailed executive pay disclosures, and document that large Cournot competitors adopt revenue-based pay in response to the disclosure mandate. Smaller firms and Bertrand competitors do not respond in this fashion. I find no evidence that agency theory can explain these patterns. Collectively, my results are consistent with strategic delegation, and suggest that, after the mandated disclosure of executive compensation packages, firms design their incentive contracts as strategic weapons, designed to curtail their rivals' competitive actions.
Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018
Mode of access: World Wide Web
ISBN: 9780355804041Subjects--Topical Terms:
561166
Accounting.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:
554714
Electronic books.
Compensation Disclosures and the Weaponization of Executive Pay : = Evidence from Revenue-based Performance Evaluation.
LDR
:02251ntm a2200349Ki 4500
001
918195
005
20181022132747.5
006
m o u
007
cr mn||||a|a||
008
190606s2018 xx obm 000 0 eng d
020
$a
9780355804041
035
$a
(MiAaPQ)AAI10743013
035
$a
(MiAaPQ)uchicago:14180
035
$a
AAI10743013
040
$a
MiAaPQ
$b
eng
$c
MiAaPQ
$d
NTU
100
1
$a
Bloomfield, Matthew.
$3
1192455
245
1 0
$a
Compensation Disclosures and the Weaponization of Executive Pay :
$b
Evidence from Revenue-based Performance Evaluation.
264
0
$c
2018
300
$a
1 online resource (61 pages)
336
$a
text
$b
txt
$2
rdacontent
337
$a
computer
$b
c
$2
rdamedia
338
$a
online resource
$b
cr
$2
rdacarrier
500
$a
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-08(E), Section: A.
500
$a
Adviser: Christian Leuz.
502
$a
Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2018.
504
$a
Includes bibliographical references
520
$a
Analytical work on strategic delegation shows that Cournot competitors can boost their profitability by using revenue-based pay to commit to more aggressive behavior (Fershtman and Judd, 1987), but only if pay packages are credibly disclosed (Katz, 1991). However, no empirical evidence demonstrates that firms actually employ such strategies. I exploit a regulatory shock that forced public firms to provide detailed executive pay disclosures, and document that large Cournot competitors adopt revenue-based pay in response to the disclosure mandate. Smaller firms and Bertrand competitors do not respond in this fashion. I find no evidence that agency theory can explain these patterns. Collectively, my results are consistent with strategic delegation, and suggest that, after the mandated disclosure of executive compensation packages, firms design their incentive contracts as strategic weapons, designed to curtail their rivals' competitive actions.
533
$a
Electronic reproduction.
$b
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
$c
ProQuest,
$d
2018
538
$a
Mode of access: World Wide Web
650
4
$a
Accounting.
$3
561166
650
4
$a
Economics.
$3
555568
650
4
$a
Management.
$3
558618
655
7
$a
Electronic books.
$2
local
$3
554714
690
$a
0272
690
$a
0501
690
$a
0454
710
2
$a
ProQuest Information and Learning Co.
$3
1178819
710
2
$a
The University of Chicago.
$b
Business.
$3
1179073
773
0
$t
Dissertation Abstracts International
$g
79-08A(E).
856
4 0
$u
http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10743013
$z
click for full text (PQDT)
筆 0 讀者評論
多媒體
評論
新增評論
分享你的心得
Export
取書館別
處理中
...
變更密碼[密碼必須為2種組合(英文和數字)及長度為10碼以上]
登入