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Cognition does not affect perception.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Cognition does not affect perception./
Author:	Firestone, Chaz.
Description:	1 online resource (115 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International78-11B(E).
Subject:	Cognitive psychology. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355028508

Cognition does not affect perception.
Firestone, Chaz.

Cognition does not affect perception. - 1 online resource (115 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

There may be no more foundational distinction between types of processes in the mind than the distinction between seeing and thinking. How do perception and cognition interact? And how do they fail to interact? A tidal wave of recent research, spanning two decades and hundreds of papers, has alleged that higher-level cognitive states such as desires, emotions, intentions, and linguistic representations reach down into visual processing and literally change what we see. As a result, there is a growing consensus that such effects are ubiquitous, and that the distinction between seeing and thinking may itself be unsustainable. This dissertation argues otherwise: There is in fact no compelling evidence for such top-down effects of cognition on perception, or "cognitive penetrability". I report several case studies of empirically anchored `pitfalls' that recast such evidence, in each case showing how alleged top-down effects on perception not only can be explained by alternative factors, but in fact are explained by such factors. I also organize these pitfalls into a `checklist' that future work could use to convincingly demonstrate top-down effects on visual perception. Perception may interact with cognition in deep and interesting ways, but there are powerful constraints on the relationship between seeing and thinking imposed by fundamental principles of how the mind is organized.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355028508Subjects--Topical Terms:

556029
Cognitive psychology.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Cognition does not affect perception.
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245 1 0 $a Cognition does not affect perception.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: B.
500 $a Adviser: Brian J. Scholl.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a There may be no more foundational distinction between types of processes in the mind than the distinction between seeing and thinking. How do perception and cognition interact? And how do they fail to interact? A tidal wave of recent research, spanning two decades and hundreds of papers, has alleged that higher-level cognitive states such as desires, emotions, intentions, and linguistic representations reach down into visual processing and literally change what we see. As a result, there is a growing consensus that such effects are ubiquitous, and that the distinction between seeing and thinking may itself be unsustainable. This dissertation argues otherwise: There is in fact no compelling evidence for such top-down effects of cognition on perception, or "cognitive penetrability". I report several case studies of empirically anchored `pitfalls' that recast such evidence, in each case showing how alleged top-down effects on perception not only can be explained by alternative factors, but in fact are explained by such factors. I also organize these pitfalls into a `checklist' that future work could use to convincingly demonstrate top-down effects on visual perception. Perception may interact with cognition in deep and interesting ways, but there are powerful constraints on the relationship between seeing and thinking imposed by fundamental principles of how the mind is organized.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Cognitive psychology. $3 556029
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
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