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Answering Dreyfus's Challenge Toward a Theory of Concepts without Intellectualism.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Answering Dreyfus's Challenge Toward a Theory of Concepts without Intellectualism./
作者:	Temple, Kevin.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (291 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International78-11A(E).
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355055597

Answering Dreyfus's Challenge Toward a Theory of Concepts without Intellectualism.
Temple, Kevin.

Answering Dreyfus's Challenge Toward a Theory of Concepts without Intellectualism. - 1 online resource (291 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The New School, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

John McDowell's debates about concepts with Robert Brandom and Hubert Dreyfus over the past two decades reveal key commitments each philosopher makes. McDowell is committed to giving concepts a role in our embodied coping, extending rational form to human experience. Brandom is committed to defining concepts in a way that helps make rationality distinct. And Dreyfus is committed to explaining how rational understanding develops out of lesser abilities we share with human infants and other animals (I call this "Dreyfus's challenge"). These commitments appear irreconcilable. I argue to the contrary that they are, in principle, reconcilable, provided we give up their shared "rationalist" commitment to the idea that the rational use of language is necessary for having concepts. First, I exploit Brandom and McDowell's debate to motivate abandoning the rationalist commitment. Next, I exploit Dreyfus and McDowell's debate to establish the need for a broader notion of concepts to answer Dreyfus's challenge. I turn to Elizabeth Camp's broader notion of concepts as spontaneously, systematically recombinable representations, and establish that it lacks resources for distinguishing human rationality. To resolve that weakness, I integrate Camp's notion of concepts with John Haugeland's theory of objectivity, which does make rationality distinct. Finally, drawing my integration of Camp and Haugeland, I propose a way to answer Dreyfus's challenge, which I call "relaxed holism." The core of relaxed holism is a cumulative, developmental sequence of three related cognitive abilities: representation, concepts, and metacognition. I argue that relaxed holism also reconciles both McDowell's commitment to giving normatively governed concepts a role in embodied coping, and Brandom's commitment to defining concepts in a way that helps make rationality distinct.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355055597Subjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Answering Dreyfus's Challenge Toward a Theory of Concepts without Intellectualism.
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