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Inventing Perceptual Content : = The Given from Kant to McDowell.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Inventing Perceptual Content :/
其他題名:	The Given from Kant to McDowell.
作者:	Browning, Jacob.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (185 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-12A(E).
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780438265509

Inventing Perceptual Content : = The Given from Kant to McDowell.
Browning, Jacob.

Inventing Perceptual Content :The Given from Kant to McDowell. - 1 online resource (185 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The New School, 2018.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation focuses on the peculiar status of perceptual content in contemporary accounts of conceptualism. Specifically, conceptualists find themselves in a dilemma: either deny any account of perceptual content (e.g., Robert Brandom), or develop one based on our "common-sense" categories (e.g., John McDowell). This has unfortunate consequences in regards to contemporary philosophy of mind, both regarding studies of perception and in understanding animal cognition. The upshot of this dissertation is two-fold: first, it shows why this is a false dilemma, and second, it shows that both horns of the dilemma are unsatisfactory.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780438265509Subjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Inventing Perceptual Content : = The Given from Kant to McDowell.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Zed Adams.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The New School, 2018.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a This dissertation focuses on the peculiar status of perceptual content in contemporary accounts of conceptualism. Specifically, conceptualists find themselves in a dilemma: either deny any account of perceptual content (e.g., Robert Brandom), or develop one based on our "common-sense" categories (e.g., John McDowell). This has unfortunate consequences in regards to contemporary philosophy of mind, both regarding studies of perception and in understanding animal cognition. The upshot of this dissertation is two-fold: first, it shows why this is a false dilemma, and second, it shows that both horns of the dilemma are unsatisfactory.
520 $a To show this is a false dilemma, I open with (what I dub) Sellars's "lost insight" from the myth of Jones: the perceptual categories adopted need not be unrevisable. This simple claim proves to be a helpful key for recognizing the false moves made in numerous historical figures up through the present.
520 $a To show why both horns are unsatisfactory, I present a series of historical sketches on figures in the history of conceptualism and "the given." I show that this dilemma has a long history originating in Immanuel Kant's work on perception. This is surprising because Kant's version of conceptualism is very different from contemporary accounts--despite efforts to assimilate him to our present. I argue the same dilemma recurs in very different forms of conceptualism and with many and incompatible ideas of perceptual content. I focus on Bertrand Russell, Rudolf Carnap, C.I. Lewis, and John McDowell, highlighting how each figure falls on one horn of the other of the dilemma: either denying perceptual content any independent role, or endorsing a "common-sense" account that is supposedly obvious.
520 $a I conclude that conceptualism can endorse an account of perceptual content so long as it abandons the notion that "common-sense" is impervious to historical trends or the findings of science. As Sellars recognized, this does not require a return to the myth of the given; rather, it provides us with a far more robust and insightful conceptualism and more useful account of perception.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
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710 2 $a The New School. $b Philosophy. $3 1192989
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 79-12A(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10744464 $z click for full text (PQDT)