國立虎尾科技大學 |

Knowing Yourself Is Something You Do.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Knowing Yourself Is Something You Do./
Author:	Peacocke, Antonia Michelle Rosen.
Description:	1 online resource (129 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-01(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International80-01A(E).
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780438325081

Knowing Yourself Is Something You Do.
Peacocke, Antonia Michelle Rosen.

Knowing Yourself Is Something You Do. - 1 online resource (129 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-01(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2018.

Includes bibliographical references

Why do your self-attributions of beliefs and intentions ordinarily constitute authoritative self-knowledge? You can self-attribute a belief or an intention transparently. For instance, you can transparently self-attribute a belief that p by judging that p. You can transparently self-attribute an intention to phi by deciding to phi. However, recognizing just this much does not completely explain the epistemology of transparent self-attributions.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780438325081Subjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Knowing Yourself Is Something You Do.
LDR:03837ntm a2200385Ki 4500 001 918681
005 20181030085012.5
006 m o u
007 cr mn||||a|a||
008 190606s2018 xx obm 000 0 eng d
020 $a 9780438325081
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10817574
035 $a (MiAaPQ)berkeley:17926
035 $a AAI10817574
040 $a MiAaPQ $b eng $c MiAaPQ $d NTU
100 1 $a Peacocke, Antonia Michelle Rosen. $3 1193070
245 1 0 $a Knowing Yourself Is Something You Do.
264 0 $c 2018
300 $a 1 online resource (129 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-01(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: John Campbell; Barry Stroud.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2018.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Why do your self-attributions of beliefs and intentions ordinarily constitute authoritative self-knowledge? You can self-attribute a belief or an intention transparently. For instance, you can transparently self-attribute a belief that p by judging that p. You can transparently self-attribute an intention to phi by deciding to phi. However, recognizing just this much does not completely explain the epistemology of transparent self-attributions.
520 $a Self-attributions of this kind count as authoritative knowledge because they involve a form of practical knowledge. You can intentionally control the kind of attitude you take up in conscious thought, and when you do that, you know what kind of attitude you are taking up in conscious thought. Then, in the context of transparent self-attribution of belief or intention, a judgment that p or a decision to phi can have a complex identity. A judgment that p can also be a self-attribution of a belief that p, and a decision to phi can also be a self-attribution of an intention to phi. To explain how this can be the case I introduce the linked notions of embedded mental action and content plurality.
520 $a The view of self-knowledge that emerges also explains why there are contents involving belief attributions that are absurd to assert or to judge even though they can be true. These contents are Moorean absurdities for belief. I argue that there are no corresponding Moorean absurdities for intention, even though you also have transparent self-knowledge of what you intend to do. This points to an important attitudinal distinction between belief and intention: intentions are not beliefs.
520 $a The difference between first-personal and third-personal methods of attributing attitudes is subtle. The specialness of the first-personal perspective cannot be explained in terms of epistemic groundlessness, as many have tried to do. You must also make third- personal groundless attributions of belief to understand others' intentional behavior.
520 $a Despite philosophical skepticism on this point, transparent self-knowledge really is valuable, in a special sense. Having complete diachronic transparent self-knowledge involves having no hidden attitudes and having a diachronically unified self of the kind that is required for evaluation in terms of authenticity.
520 $a The epistemology of self-knowledge relies crucially on the fact that you can do things in thought. Knowing yourself is something you do because intentional action is indispensable to authoritative, knowledgeable self-attribution of beliefs and intentions.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 559771
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0422
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a University of California, Berkeley. $b Philosophy. $3 1182449
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 80-01A(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10817574 $z click for full text (PQDT)