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Laws of Nature as Identities of Facts.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Laws of Nature as Identities of Facts./
作者:	Maxwell, Mark Gerald.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (148 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-11(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-11A(E).
標題:	Philosophy of science. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780438194113

Laws of Nature as Identities of Facts.
Maxwell, Mark Gerald.

Laws of Nature as Identities of Facts. - 1 online resource (148 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-11(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2018.

Includes bibliographical references

I introduce a view of laws of nature on which laws are to be understood in terms of identities of fact. If it is a law of nature that the phenomena X and Y always appear together, then we can consider the possibility that the reason they always appear together is that they are in fact the very same thing. Understanding how this can be, and exploring just how far this kind of hypothesis can take us is the subject the dissertation.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780438194113Subjects--Topical Terms:

1009373
Philosophy of science.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Laws of Nature as Identities of Facts.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-11(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Michael Della Rocca.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2018.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a I introduce a view of laws of nature on which laws are to be understood in terms of identities of fact. If it is a law of nature that the phenomena X and Y always appear together, then we can consider the possibility that the reason they always appear together is that they are in fact the very same thing. Understanding how this can be, and exploring just how far this kind of hypothesis can take us is the subject the dissertation.
520 $a In order to understand how these seemingly disparate facts can be "identical", I introduce the "bare facts". These are what we might ordinarily call the facts, but stripped of their ontological commitments. Setting aside ontological commitments gives the bare facts the flexibility needed to relate apparently distinct things, and being able to separate ontology from the rest of metaphysics opens the door to understanding the kinds of theory change that can be induced by reflection on the laws of nature.
520 $a Chapter 1 is a direct investigation of laws of nature, showing how to productively violate the presupposed ontology by means of an identity of facts. I start with a historical example, where understanding an empirical regularity as an identity can give us insight into the nature of the Copernican revolution. Along the way, I propose an analysis of "law of nature" that places the identity of facts in the central explanatory role.
520 $a Chapter 2 deals with what looks like a major counterintuitive implication of Chapter 1. Not only do I suggest that synchronic laws of nature can be explained as identities, but also that diachronic laws can be explained as identities. But then there are facts that do not have their time essentially, and can be described as being at one time or as being at another time with equal fidelity. To handle this circumstance, I introduce an independently motivated theory of time that treats different times as different perspectives on the very same collection of facts.
520 $a Taking a view of laws that allows for (or demands) conceptual change will lead to different perspectives on other aspects of science as well. Chapter 3 dips into epistemology, contemplating an application to the problem of induction. Using the same set of motivating ideas as in Chapter 1, I reformulate the problem of induction as a problem with the ontological presuppositions that we make, showing how accepting an induction is, at least, not worse than not accepting it. Given a regularity in the world, we can anticipate a conceptual advance that leads to a unification of the form of Chapter 1. But, as it turns out, we don't have to wait for the conceptual advance to start taking advantage of the possibility of the conceptual advance.
520 $a Chapter 4 steps back to consider what it is for facts to be identical, beginning the project of establishing the "bare facts" as a metaphysical underpinning for the conceptual freedom that we have exploited in chapters 1, 2, and 3. To that end, we develop a semantic system that constructs the objects and properties -- the "ontology" -- from the bare facts, rather than constructing the facts from the objects and properties, as is usually done. The result is a framework flexible enough to bridge theories that appear to be talking about different things, showing how we can use the bare facts to track the data through conceptual change.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
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650 4 $a Metaphysics. $3 555859
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856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10927841 $z click for full text (PQDT)